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Today, electronic computing devices are critically involved in our daily lives,
basic infrastructure, and national defense systems. With the growing number of
threats against them, hardware-based security features offer the best chance for
building secure and trustworthy cyber systems. In this dissertation, we investigate
ways of making hardware-based security into a reality with primary focus on two
areas: Hardware Trojan Detection and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs).
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications made to original IC designs or
layouts that can jeopardize the integrity of hardware and software platforms. Since
most modern systems critically depend on ICs, detection of hardware Trojans has
garnered significant interest in academia, industry, as well as governmental agen-
cies. The majority of existing detection schemes focus on test-time because of the
limited hardware resources available at run-time. In this dissertation, we explore
innovative run-time solutions that utilize on-chip thermal sensor measurements and
fundamental estimation/detection theory to expose changes in IC power/thermal
profile caused by Trojan activation. The proposed solutions are low overhead and
also generalizable to many other sensing modalities and problem instances. Simu-
lation results using state-of-the-art tools on publicly available Trojan benchmarks
verify that our approaches can detect Trojans quickly and with few false positives.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are circuits that rely on IC fabrication
variations to generate unique signatures for various security applications such as
IC authentication, anti-counterfeiting, cryptographic key generation, and tamper
resistance. While the existence of variations has been well exploited in PUF design,
knowledge of exactly how variations come into existence has largely been ignored.
Yet, for several decades the Design-for-Manufacturability (DFM) community has
actually investigated the fundamental sources of these variations. Furthermore,
since manufacturing variations are often harmful to IC yield, the existing DFM
tools have been geared towards suppressing them (counter-intuitive for PUFs). In
this dissertation, we make several improvements over current state-of-the-art work
in PUFs. First, our approaches exploit existing DFM models to improve PUFs at
physical layout and mask generation levels. Second, our proposed algorithms reverse
the role of standard DFM tools and extend them towards improving PUF quality
without harming non-PUF portions of the IC. Finally, since our approaches occur
after design and before fabrication, they are applicable to all types of PUFs and
have little overhead in terms of area, power, etc.
The innovative and unconventional techniques presented in this dissertation
should act as important building blocks for future work in cyber security.
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1.1 Evolution of Computing Devices and Need for Cyber Security
Continued semiconductor scaling and outsourcing of the integrated circuit (IC)
design/fabrication process have resulted in electronic computing devices with greater
performance at faster time-to-market and lower prices. These factors combined with
the advances in connectivity between devices have revolutionized the technology
landscape and enabled previously unimaginable applications. The computing sys-
tems of today are universal tools and platforms that play an increasing role in our
daily lives and basic infrastructure. For instance, smart phones and other mobile de-
vices are now widely used for communication, personal organization, online banking,
navigation, and internet. Embedded computing devices are also critical components
in larger systems of the financial, commercial, and military sectors. Automobiles, air
traffic control systems, the power grid, national defense systems, etc. all critically
depend on the computing infrastructure provided by integrated circuits (ICs).
While most of these advances have improved our everyday lives, our vulnera-
bility to cyber attacks has also increased dramatically. For example, outsourcing of
various steps of the IC design/fabrication process has made it easier for untrusted
third parties to insert malicious circuits (hardware Trojans), steal intellectual prop-
erty (IP), and make counterfeit electronics. At the same time, the ever decreasing
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size of IC features and increasing complexity of modern designs are making it nearly
impossible to detect the fake and modified ICs.
Given the pervasiveness of computing devices in commerce and defense, at-
tacks launched against them can have potentially devastating consequences. For
example, consider how much of our personal and confidential information is stored
on smartphones, PCs, and remote servers. If this information falls into the wrong
hands, it could put individuals at risk for identity theft. Even more alarming are
the cyber and denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on networks and safety-critical sys-
tems (power grid, emergency response, defense, etc.) that can result in deaths.
With the growing number of attacks looming, the need for sophisticated technology
that ensures the confidentiality, integrity, and reliability of our computing systems,
stored data, and IP has never been larger.
1.2 Software vs. Hardware-assisted Security
Traditionally, computing systems have relied upon software-assisted security
in the form of user passwords, key encryption algorithms, anti-virus software, anti-
malware software, etc. However, software-based solutions provide only limited secu-
rity and may still leave systems susceptible to intelligent and well-funded attackers.
In the case of encryption, the cryptographic key is a single point of failure and
can be leaked by various vulnerabilities of Operating Systems (software Trojans,
key-loggers, etc.). Antivirus and anti-malware software are attempts to prevent
such attacks, but are also inherently flawed because they rely solely on feedback
2
from developers. Developers must first recognize the existence of an attack and
then address it with an antivirus/anti-malware database entry or patch. However,
zero-day exploits (i.e. the attacks that occur prior to developer intervention) can
still subvert system security [1]. Finally, any software-assisted security solution can
often be subverted by a physical attack on hardware, the platform on which the
software is running. For example, an adversary can de-package a chip, drill into the
inner layers of the circuit, and directly probe signal lines with the help of advanced
semiconductor tools (Scanning Electron Microscope, Focused Ion Beam, etc.) [2].
Due to the limitations of software-based security measures, the role of hardware
in security has been growing in recent years. For instance, secure cryptoprocessors
are dedicated devices embedded in a tamper resistant package which can be used
to carry out cryptographic operations and handle passwords/keys more securely.
Examples include smartcards [3] and Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) [4]. Phys-
ically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [5] are promising solutions to many security
issues due their ability to generate IC unique identifiers that are resistant to cloning
attempts as well as physical tampering. Recently, Intel and McAfee have also been
working on security solutions that move beyond Operating Systems (OS) and rely
more heavily on underlying hardware [1].
The trend towards hardware-assisted security is driven by two advantages
hardware has over software:
• Level of Abstraction: Since computer hardware operates at the lowest abstrac-
tion level, hardware-based solutions can be faster, more energy efficient, and
3
tougher to counter than those in software [1]. This also allows hardware to
play roles against both hardware- and software-based attacks. Software, on
the other hand, can do little against attacks on hardware (eg. microprobing).
• Degree of Modifiability: The ability to easily update software is both an ad-
vantage and disadvantage. On the one hand, developers can fix and patch
problems. On the other hand, the same flexibility can also be exploited by
attackers to install and upgrade viruses, Trojans, and malware. In contrast,
hardware chips cannot be (easily) modified by an attacker once they leave the
foundry.
1.3 Hardware-based Attacks
While the assistance of hardware can dramatically improve system security,
even the hardware-based solutions discussed above have a flaw: they rely on the
assumption that the ICs which make up computing platforms are trustworthy. While
in the recent past this assumption was reasonable, continued outsourcing in the
semiconductor industry has made it increasingly possible for counterfeit and Trojan-
infected ICs to be inserted into the supply chain.
Counterfeiting is a practice that causes irrecoverable loss to the IP holder and
can harm the reputation of authentic providers. Unreliability of counterfeits can
also render systems that unknowingly use them unreliable. A hardware Trojan is
“a malicious, undesired, intentional modification of an electronic circuit or design,


























Figure 1.1: Attacks on the IC Supply Chain/Process
back-door that can be inserted into hardware” [6]. Such attacks represent a con-
siderable danger because they allow adversaries to exploit the advantages possessed
by hardware. By modifying the hardware before it leaves the factory, attackers can
essentially circumvent many hardware- and software-based security features [6].
Hardware attacks occurring during IC design/fabrication and after IC deploy-
ment are discussed in more detail in the sections below.
1.3.1 Sources of Attack in the IC Supply Chain
The wide spectrum of attacks on hardware and the ease with which attacks
can now occur within the IC supply chain is very concerning. Essentially, attacks
on hardware are possible at any stage of the design and manufacturing process. We
highlight the attackers and attacks in Figure 1.1, and we summarize them in the
sections below.
1.3.1.1 Design Phase
The IC supply chain/process starts with the design phase where a designer or
design team writes a register transfer level (RTL) description of the IC according
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to design specifications. In the past, an IC company might have designed every
component of the RTL itself. However, today most companies typically integrate
third party Intellectual Property (IP) along with their own IP. Attacks in the de-
sign phase can occur through this third party IP, by adversaries who infiltrate the
design process, and by malicious insiders. Infiltrators and insiders are particularly
dangerous since they may have full access to the design and source files.
There are two main attacks that are possible during the design phase:
1. Trojan insertion: If the attacker has write access, he or she can maliciously add
or remove hardware components from the original design (so-called hardware
Trojan attacks). Such attacks can leak sensitive data such as cryptographic
keys or reduce the reliability of the design (discussed in greater detail in Chap-
ter 2). The third party IP may also behave unexpectedly and maliciously.
2. IP Theft: If the attacker only has read access, he or she can still analyze the
design or steal the company’s IP. Stolen IP can be used by the attacker to
produce counterfeit instances of the design. Analysis of the stolen IP can be
used to aid in future software or hardware-based attacks as well.
1.3.1.2 Synthesis Phase
When the design phase is complete, the RTL design is synthesized using third
party software tools from Cadence, Synopsys, Mentor Graphics, etc. Synthesis
begins by translating the high-level RTL to a technology-independent gate level
logic diagram. The technology-independent design is then mapped to a standard
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cell library and converted to a transistor-level netlist. Finally, place-and-route tools
determine the physical layout of the entire design. Performance-based optimization
algorithms (number of literals/gates, area, timing, power, etc.) are often employed
in each abstraction level.
During the synthesis phase, an attacker can once again perform two attacks:
1. Trojan insertion: If the attacker has write access, he or she can insert Trojans
by adding or removing gates and transistors at the various steps of the syn-
thesis process. The attacker can also reduce the performance and reliability
of the design by manipulating interconnects in the layout (increase capacitive
coupling, aging effects, etc.). Even if the attacker does not have direct access
to the synthesis process, the third party tools and standard cell libraries might
also be untrustworthy and execute similar attacks.
2. IP Theft: If the attacker only has read access, he or she can gather information
from netlists, layout, etc. to aid in future attacks or to create counterfeit
devices.
1.3.1.3 Fabrication Phase
When synthesis is complete, the layout files are sent to a foundry, which gen-
erates lithography masks and then fabricates the chips. In the past, an IC company
could use an in-house foundry (i.e. fab) facility. However, the costs to not only
establish but maintain a full-scale fab have become prohibitively expensive. Thus,
the use of contract (untrusted) foundries has become a necessity for all but a few
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IC companies (eg. Intel). Attackers in the foundry may accomplish three different
kinds of attacks:
1. Trojan Insertion: An attacker at the foundry will have access to the layout
geometry as well as the mask generation, which will enable him or her to insert
Trojans before fabrication.
2. Overbuilding: Current IC fabrication practices provide little to limit the num-
ber of ICs produced by the fab. Therefore, once the fab has produced the
amount of ICs requested by the IC company, an attacker may be able to
create additional ICs to sell on the black market. This is referred to as an
overbuilding attack and results in irrecoverable loss to the IP holder.
3. IP theft: With the layout or masks, it is feasible (albeit expensive) for an
attacker to reverse-engineer the original design. Once again, the attacker could
then analyze the design for reference in future attacks or use the information
to produce counterfeit instances of the design.
1.3.2 Post-deployment Attacks
Aside from vulnerabilities during design and fabrication, there are also a vari-
ety of attacks that can occur once an IC has been deployed:
1. Trojan Activation: While Trojans are inserted during the design or manufac-
turing process, the malicious circuitry is often such that the Trojan remains
dormant until some triggering event (more details to come in Chapter 2). In
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doing so, the adverse effects caused by the Trojan can be hidden from post-
manufacturing tests, thereby increasing the likelihood that a Trojan-infected
IC passes tests and is deployed into the field. Later on, when Trojan is acti-
vated, it can execute its attack (leak information, open back-doors, etc.) on
an unsuspecting system.
2. Counterfeiting: Aside from the IP theft discussed above, counterfeiting can
also be accomplished in other ways. For instance, in IC recycling attacks, old
ICs are refurbished and promoted as new products. This is dangerous because
the refurbishing process itself can harm the IC and result in premature failure
of any system dependent on the IC. Failure to adequately test an IC for long
term use and reliability (a process known as upscreening) can lead to similar
issues for unsuspecting consumers and systems as well.
3. Reverse-Engineering: Well-funded adversaries can spend weeks using special-
ized equipment to de-package, de-layer, and image an IC [7]. While this pro-
cess is invasive (i.e. destroys the chip), the recovered information can be
exploited by attackers to understand the IC’s internal features at various lev-
els of abstraction (system level, transistor level, etc.), thereby enabling both
counterfeiting and future Trojan insertion attacks.
4. Microprobing: The same equipment used for reverse-engineering can also be
used to access the chip surface directly and observe nodes of the IC. For
example, one can exploit vulnerabilities (i.e. data remanence) in “erased”
non-volatile and “unpowered” volatile memory to steal sensitive/secret data
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[8].
5. Fault Injection: Malfunctions in an IC can be triggered by exposing it to abnor-
mal environmental conditions (intensive light pulses, radiation, local heating,
etc.) and then used to infer secret information [8].
6. Side Channel Attacks: Side channels of a device are parameters that charac-
terize the device’s physical implementation, such as delay, power consumption,
glitches, etc. Correlation existing between side channels and the data being
processed by the device can be exploited by attackers to gain information
about the IC. Such attacks have been shown to successfully recover keys from
smartcards on the order of seconds [9], which is a far cry from the billions of
years it would take to crack most encryption standards (eg. AES) by brute
force methods.
1.4 Theme: A Comprehensive Strategy
The attacks discussed above are summarized in Figure 1.2 with supply chain
attacks on the left and post-deployment attacks on the right. One can see that they
are quite diverse and interdependent, which makes providing assurances against all
of them very challenging. For instance, even if one designs a PC with a TPM [4],
there’s no guarantee that a Trojan won’t be inserted into the TPM during synthesis
or fabrication steps. When the Trojan is activated in the field, the security of the
PC will be compromised. Furthermore, even if one could guarantee trust in the
entire supply chain, this would not provide assurances against all post-deployment
10
Hardware Attacks






















Figure 1.2: Summary of Hardware Attacks. The lefthand side is organized based on location of
attack in the IC supply chain. The righthand side is organized based on the type of
post-deployment attack.
attacks.
These challenges have motivated us to come up with better solutions in this
dissertation. To deal with the complex interdependencies between the phases of
the IC supply chain/process and the IC’s post-deployment lifetime, we emphasize a
comprehensive strategy. Essentially, our strategy borrows from solutions that have
been used to improve yield, reliability, etc. in the past and extends them towards
security. Our strategy is shown in Figure 1.3 and consists of three steps:
1. Bootstrap: Since ICs are basically unmodifiable after fabrication, designers
have begun to rely on embedded infrastructures that improve IC performance,
yield, and reliability. For example, it is now common practice to deploy error
11
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Figure 1.3: Comprehensive Strategy for Self-sustaining Security
correcting code (ECC) in memory for robustness against soft and hard er-
rors. Our ‘Bootstrap’ step is essentially an extension of this concept towards
security.
In the past, security has been only considered as an afterthought during design
and fabrication. However, it is becoming apparent that security constraints
are just as important as performance, power, etc. constraints. The main
function of our ‘Bootstap’ step is to provide better infrastructure, circuits,
and fabrication methods that support IC validation and attack forensics once
chips are fabricated and deployed. For example, by fabricating sensors that
monitor IC side-channel activity, we may be able to detect Trojan presence
at run-time. Information leakage-resistant circuit designs, IC watermarking,
and tamper-resistant structures (such as PUFs [10]), should also enable better
post-deployment security. The key challenge of implementing these ‘Boot-
stap’ features is to do so with minimal overheads and impact on area, power,
performance, etc.
2. Validate: Conventionally, post-manufacturing tests are used to verify that
the gates of an IC operate as expected. The need to do this arises from the
defects that might occur during chip fabrication, such as shorted and floating
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nodes. The ’Validate’ step in our approach uses similar procedures to test
for security. For example, one can exploit recent work in the literature which
detects hardware Trojans by testing for unexpected changes in logical and side-
channel behavior from the original design (more details in Section 2.1.2.2).
In this step, we can also collect data from (verified) Trojan-free and non-
counterfeit devices to establish expected IC behavior and validate ICs at run-
time. For example, one can record the challenge-response behavior of a PUF
embedded in the design (more details in Section 2.2.2) to verify IC authenticity.
3. Monitor and React: While the pre-deployment testing performed in the ‘Vali-
date’ step is extremely important, it cannot be relied on to find all IC instances
containing Trojans [11, 6]. Furthermore, it cannot protect against other post-
deployment attacks, such as IC recycling. The ‘Monitor and React’ step in
our strategy aims to overcome this flaw. In this step, one can use the infras-
tructures and sensors (added by ‘Bootstrap’) to ‘Monitor’ the IC behavior at
run-time. Data gathered from design simulations and from ‘Validate’ can be
compared against run-time behavior, and any anomalous behavior detected
might indicate a potential Trojan or counterfeit attack. Once an attack is
suspected, built-in defenses could then be triggered to ‘React’ or thwart it be-
fore it does any damage. For example, one might react to a Trojan attack by
quarantining the Trojan-infected portion of the IC before it can leak sensitive
information. In the case of counterfeits, the best mode of defense might be to
warn others by reporting the attack to a central database.
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The above three-phase strategy is both comprehensive and self-sustaining in
nature. It is comprehensive in that it effectively combines several techniques for
attack prevention, detection, and recovery. Each step builds on infrastructure and
results from the previous step to overcome security vulnerabilities in prior steps.
Furthermore, the above strategy is also self-sustaining because the information ob-
tained from latter steps can be exploited to improve future device instances. For
example, forensic data on hardware Trojans obtained from the ‘Monitor and React’
step could be used to make future designs and tests more robust to the hardware
Trojans detected in past deployments.
1.5 Summary and Thesis Organization
ICs are the basic building blocks of today’s computing systems. Advance-
ments that have created higher-performance, lower-cost ICs have also resulted in
new opportunities for hardware-based attacks during IC design, manufacturing, and
lifetime. Hardware-based attacks, such as Trojan insertion and counterfeit devices,
are a critical danger since they have the ability to subvert many forms of software-
and hardware-based security. The ever growing complexity of ICs and reliance on
outsourcing have made ensuring IC security more difficult than ever. In parallel,
modern computing hardware, tools, and imaging technology, are also making it
easier to attack ICs after they are deployed.
In this dissertation, we investigate new solutions to overcome attacks during
IC design, manufacturing, and post-deployment lifetime. Specifically, we focus on
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two areas:
• Hardware Trojans: We study hardware Trojans because they are among the
most challenging attacks to prevent, detect, and counter. First, they can be
inserted at any untrusted step of the IC supply chain/process. Second, they
are extremely challenging to detect because of their small size and stealthy na-
ture. Third, the sheer number of attacks against both hardware and software
that can be executed or aided by a hardware Trojan is immense. Further-
more, the persistence of hardware Trojan attacks (i.e. the threat is present
as long as the infected IC is in use) makes detection of their presence ex-
tremely important. In this dissertation, we present a novel Trojan detection
approach [12] which is a basic instance of the comprehensive strategy shown
in Figure 1.3. Specifically, we combine new and old infrastructures, a new side
channel metric (temperature), and advanced statistical techniques to estimate
an IC’s internal state at run-time and detect hardware Trojan attacks as they
occur.
• Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs): We also investigate PUFs [5], which
are embedded components in ICs that extract IC manufacturing variations
to generate unique, random, and unclonable signatures. At a relatively small
overhead, the PUF signatures can be used to deal with the IP theft, over-
building, counterfeiting, and physical attacks [13] shown in Figure 1.2. Our
work with respect to PUFs is an instance of the ‘Bootstrap’ step in the com-
prehensive strategy (see Figure 1.3). Specifically, we leverage existing models
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(which are largely ignored in current PUF research) to summarize the sources
of IC variation as well as their impacts on PUFs. Automated approaches for
physical layout and mask generation are then re-investigated in the context
of these variations in order to improve PUF quality and make PUFs more
effective against post-deployment attacks.
Organization. The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2,
we discuss the background of hardware Trojans and PUFs in greater detail, includ-
ing the current state-of-the-art research and associated shortcomings. Chapter 3
discusses the motivation and details of our proposed Trojan detection approach,
which is a basic instance of the comprehensive strategy shown in Figure 1.3. In
Chapters 4 and 5, we discuss our innovative techniques for enhancing PUF quality
over the current state-of-the-art methods. We summarize the conclusions of our




In this chapter, we discuss the background and key challenges of research
related to Hardware Trojans and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs).
2.1 Hardware Trojan Attacks and Mitigation
The emerging trend of outsourcing integrated circuit (IC) design and fabri-
cation has created new opportunities called hardware Trojan attacks that can seri-
ously jeopardize the integrity of any electronic system. As discussed in the previous
chapter, anyone with access to the IC manufacturing process, which includes de-
sign, synthesis, and fabrication, can make malicious alterations to the original or
intended circuity which expose system hardware and software to various attacks. In
this section, we discuss the background of hardware Trojans and current research
directions. The section is organized as follows:
• Hardware Trojans have various physical, activation, and attack characteris-
tics which shall determine their effects on a computing system. Our ability
to defend against Trojans relies heavily on our understanding of these char-
acteristics. In Section 2.1.1, we summarize Trojan anatomy, taxonomy, and
real-life examples to frame our discussion of Trojan research in latter sections
and chapters.
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• Due to the serious threat that hardware Trojans pose to all systems and sec-
tors dependent on ICs, detection of hardware Trojans has garnered significant
interest not only in academia, but also in governmental agencies and industry.
In Section 2.1.2, we discuss the current state-of-the-art methods for Trojan
prevention and detection as well as their associated challenges and shortcom-
ings.
• Finally, we conclude with a summary of the section.
2.1.1 Trojan Anatomy and Taxonomy
2.1.1.1 Anatomy of a Trojan
An example of Trojan circuitry is shown in Figure 2.1. Trojans typically
consist of two components [14]:
• Trojan Trigger: The trigger waits for a special event and then activates the
Trojan’s attack. Common events include rare external input patterns and in-
ternal logic states. Before the Trojan is triggered, the IC containing the Trojan
functions mainly as intended (excluding the trigger’s activity). Figure 2.1 is
an illustration of Trojan circuitry with a NAND gate acting as the trigger.
As long as at least one of the n input nets is a logic 0 (LO), the Trojan will
remain inactive and the net of the original circuit will remain unchanged.
• Trojan Payload: After the Trojan is triggered, the IC’s functionality is changed






Figure 2.1: Trojan circuity: Trigger and Payload
the Trojan is triggered and the original net signal is logic 1 (HI), the payload
changes the net to a LO signal.
In this dissertation, we refer to ICs with Trojans as Trojan-inserted or
Trojan-infected. We refer to ICs without Trojans as Trojan-free. Trojan-
inserted ICs whose payloads have been triggered and not triggered are referred
to as Trojan-active and Trojan-inactive respectively.
2.1.1.2 Trojan Taxonomy
In order to facilitate development of Trojan detection and mitigation schemes,
there have been various hardware Trojan taxonomies proposed in the literature.
Our taxonomy (inspired from [15, 14]) is shown in Figure 2.2 and classifies Trojans
according to physical, activation, and action characteristics:
1. Physical Characteristics describe the hardware manifestations of Trojans and
are subdivided into four categories: Distribution, Structure, Size, and Type.
Distribution denotes how the Trojan appears in the layout (e.g. spread out or
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Figure 2.2: Trojan Taxonomy
Trojan insertion. The Size category accounts for the number of components
in the chip that have been added, deleted, or compromised. Type partitions
the Trojans into functional and parametric classes. The functional class refers
to a Trojan that adds gates to or removes gates from the original design. The
parametric class denotes Trojans that are realized by modifying transistor
and interconnect parameters (to reduce performance and/or reliability). The
nature of the changes to the physical characteristics will heavily impact our
ability to detect the Trojan’s presence. For example, a small Trojan which
does not change the IC structure will be more challenging to detect compared
to a larger Trojan that does affect the structure.
2. Activation Characteristics refer to the criteria that trigger Trojan attacks.
First, Trojans can be triggered externally. For example, a rare sequence of
keystrokes on a keyboard can activate a Trojan. Second, Trojans can be acti-
vated internally. Internal activation is further subdivided into ‘always on’ and
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‘conditional’ cases. ‘Always on’ refers to the class of Trojans that are always
active and do not require a trigger (e.g. parametric type Trojans discussed
above). ‘Conditionally’ triggered Trojans refer to Trojans that are activated
when a certain logical state is reached by the IC (as shown in Figure 2.1).
Typically, an attacker will choose the activation conditions wisely so that the
Trojan is rarely active, thereby preventing accidental detection during simu-
lations and post-fabrication testing.
3. Action Characteristics identify the types of disruptive changes caused by the
Trojan. Trojans can leak information such as a secret key through unused
output ports or side channels. The modify specification class of attacks denote
Trojans that modify the performance of the IC. For example, by modifying
existing wire and transistor geometries in an IC’s critical paths, a Trojan can
degrade the IC’s performance. Modify functionality refers to Trojans that
change or bypass the original logic of an IC. For example, a Trojan can cause
a Denial-of-Service (DoS) in a processor by driving its internal clock signal to
a permanent logic 0 (LO) state.
Although it is possible for Trojans to be hybrids of the above classification
(e.g. having multiple activation characteristics), this taxonomy captures the char-
acteristics of Trojans and is useful for evaluating the capabilities of various detection
strategies [15]. For example, the above taxonomy and others like it have been critical
in developing Trojan attack models, prototypes, and benchmarks for the research
community.
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2.1.1.3 Real-life Prototypes and Benchmarks
While many of the Trojan actions and characteristics seem like something
out of science fiction, there have been various real-life prototypes and benchmarks
discussed in the literature that show just how easy it is to insert Trojans into an
unsuspecting system and bypass detection schemes. For example, the Illinois Mali-
cious Processor [16] implemented two attacks (a memory attack and a hidden shadow
mode) on a general purpose processor with only 1341 gates. During the 2008 CSAW
Embedded Systems Challenge [17], participating groups successfully implemented
several Trojan-based information leakage attacks which evaded manual detection:
leakage through RS232 protocol, thermal state, AM transmission, LED transmis-
sion, etc. [18]. Malicious Off-chip Leakage Enabled by Side channels (MOLES) [19]
was a Trojan implemented in an AES cryptographic circuit with less than 50 gates
that could leak information through power side channels. In [20], authors showed
how it was possible to intentionally modify circuit parameters without detection for
gradual performance degradation and early IC wear-out. Finally, the Trust-Hub
team has set up a website [21] for the community to upload new Trojan benchmarks
for better evaluation and comparison of different methodologies. As of this writing,
there are currently 88 benchmarks available at [21].
2.1.2 Trojan Mitigation Techniques and Associated Challenges
Due to the variety of Trojans available to an attacker, detecting hardware
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Figure 2.3: Trojan Mitigation Techniques
is simply infeasible due to the large size of modern designs. Furthermore, since
Trojans are often triggered by rare events, conventional post-manufacturing tests
which only target common and repeatable faults cannot be relied upon [22]. Thus,
researchers have had to develop new schemes to outwit attackers. The main detec-
tion and mitigation approaches are shown in Figure 2.3 and discussed in the sections
below.
2.1.2.1 Destructive Methods
Destructive techniques are reverse-engineering based approaches [23] that use
Chemical Mechanical Polishing (CMP) for de-metalization and Scanning Electron
Microscopes (SEMs) to extract layer-by-layer images of an IC. Image analysis follows
to identify transistors, gates, and interconnects and reconstruct the manufactured
IC. The reconstructed IC can be compared to the original IC design to determine if
a Trojan exists. The advantage of this approach is that provided the reconstruction
process is accurate, it is a foolproof method for detecting whether a Trojan exists
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in the IC or not.
Unfortunately, there are several disadvantages of reverse-engineering based
detection. First and foremost, they are extremely expensive and time-consuming,
potentially taking several months to reconstruct a single IC [24]. Second, the reverse-
engineering process ends up destroying the IC under test (ICUT), and hence cannot
be applied to every IC. Finally, the results of one IC cannot be extrapolated to the
entire manufactured lot, because an attacker might only insert a Trojan into a small
subset of ICs.
Due to these disadvantages, the only use for destructive methods in the current
literature is to validate a small set of “golden chips” that can be used for process
calibration and comparison of side-channels with other ICUTs (see below).
2.1.2.2 Test-time Verification Methods
These approaches consist of additional tests that take place after conventional
post-manufacturing testing. They operate under the assumption that the Trojan
circuitry will cause unexpected changes in logical and side-channel behavior from
the original design. For example, when the Trojan shown in Figure 2.1 is activated,
the payload changes a signal propagating in the circuit. The trigger and payload
also represent additional loads on the circuit that do not exist in the original design.
The additional gates have to be driven by existing gates in the design and powered
by the voltage supply, thereby causing larger delay and power consumption than in
the original design.
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There have been two types of approaches that exploit these properties:
• Logic-based approaches [25, 26, 27] develop directed test patterns that activate
Trojan payloads in order to detect errors in the output. While such approaches
have been shown to be effective for very small Trojans and be robust in the
face of noise [22], they also have several disadvantages. First, simulation-
based and functional testing both suffer from state-space explosion. Second,
the complexity of modern designs makes it difficult to control and observe all
internal node activity. Finally, such approaches cannot detect parametric type
Trojans (see Section 2.1.1.2) since IC parameters are not explicitly tested.
Thus, the scope and effectiveness of these approaches are limited.
• Side Channel-based approaches [28, 29, 30, 31] measure physical parameters of
ICUTs, such as power consumption and path delay, and compares them with
expected parameters of a “golden model” or “golden IC”. “Golden models” can
be determined through simulation tools or from verified Trojan-free ICs (see
destructive methods above). Then, if a side channel of the ICUT falls beyond
a threshold determined by empirical observations of the golden model/IC, the
ICUT is categorized as a Trojan-infected IC.
A major advantage over logic-based methods is that the Trojan payload need
not necessarily be activated in order to detect the Trojan because the trigger
alone will impact IC delay, power, etc. The drawback of side-channel ap-
proaches is their vulnerability to noise (measurement and process), which can
make it challenging to detect very small Trojans [22]. Another problem with
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side-channel analysis is that the golden model/IC may not always exist. For
example, one cannot apply side-channel analysis on third party IP since the
original/intended design and its behavior are unknown.
Due to the above disadvantages and the fact that there is only a limited
amount of time to perform post-manufacturing tests, some Trojans may be missed
by test-time methods. Thus, run-time monitoring has also been explored as an
additional line of defense against the well-hidden Trojans that circumvent test-time
verification.
2.1.2.3 Run-time Monitoring Methods
Run-time monitoring approaches [32, 33, 34] exploit the same properties as
test-time methods (i.e. differences in logical and side-channel behavior caused by
Trojans). However, the testing is performed after the IC has been deployed, which
has several unique advantages. First, rare Trojan activation can be overcome by
effective run-time monitoring. If run-time monitoring never stops, then the Trojan
activation event itself and its (potentially) large impacts on logic and side-channel
behavior can be more easily detected. Second, run-time monitors offers the flexi-
bility to tolerate Trojan-inserted ICs. In short, if the Trojan remains inactive (i.e.
not triggered) for the IC’s entire lifetime, the IC will always perform its intended
functions. Hence, a valid option would be to deploy the Trojan-inserted IC. If the
Trojan ever does become active, the run-time monitor can respond accordingly with
a defense mechanism. For example, it can disable the IC entirely to prevent the
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attack or bypass the Trojan logic to maintain correct operation (e.g. [35, 36]).
The main disadvantage of run-time monitoring has been the high resource
overheads [22] required to monitor ICs and defend against Trojan attacks. For
example, the DEFENSE platform proposed in [35] has not been prototyped and
would be difficult to implement in practice [6]. The path delay characterization
approach proposed in [32] suffers from considerable area overhead for modern designs
with millions of paths [14]. The approach in [33] adds sensors to IC power bumps for
high-resolution localized current measurements, which should come with significant
area and power overheads as well.
2.1.2.4 Design-time Methods
Design-time methods have been used in three ways:
1. Trojan Prevention/Removal: In [36], a hybrid compile-time/run-time Trojan
countermeasure called BlueChip was developed to prevent Trojan insertion.
In BlueChip, an Untrusted Circuit Identification (UCI) algorithm and tool-set
automatically identify and remove potentially malicious circuits. Any removed
hardware is replaced by logic that will trigger an exception if the removed
hardware is ever activated at run-time. Low-level trusted software will then
try to emulate what the missing hardware was trying to achieve. While this
approach is promising, it has been shown [37] that there are malicious circuits
that can still evade UCI detection. Furthermore, the proposed approach can
only be applied in processors where software can emulate removed hardware.
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2. Formal Verification/Proofs: In [38], the authors propose a new protocol where
the IP consumer provides both a hardware specification and a list of “security-
related properties” to the IP vendor. The IP vendor’s task is two-fold: (i) to
write the HDL that implements the design; (ii) to produce a formal proof that
the specified HDL fulfills all the required properties. The IP consumer can
then use a theorem prover to verify the properties when the IP is delivered.
While this is a novel approach, it also has some shortcomings. First, it relies
on a trustworthy IP vendor that will not add Trojans to the proof. Second,
specifying the security-related properties that need to be addressed in the
hardware is a nontrivial task for both IP consumers and vendors.
3. Test-time Support: There have also been several design-time strategies that
aid test-time approaches. Examples include [39] and [40] which use scan flip-
flops to increase the probability of Trojan activation and enhance side channel
analysis. The former approach increases the probability of rarely-activated
nets (i.e. places where Trojans may be triggered) during manufacturing tests.
The latter approach increases circuit activity in specific regions of the IC while
minimizing circuit activity in all other regions to provide better resolution for
side-channel analysis.
2.1.3 Summary
Hardware Trojans have various physical, activation, and attack characteristics
which can determine their effects on a computing system as well as our ability to
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detect them. Due to the serious threat that hardware Trojans pose to all systems
and sectors dependent on ICs, prevention and detection of hardware Trojans has
garnered significant interest not only in academia, but also in governmental agencies
and industry.
There have been four basic approaches to mitigate Trojans: Destructive,
Design-time, Test-time, and Run-time. While the Destructive approach may be the
most effective way to check the integrity and genuineness of an individual IC, the
complexity, amount of time, high costs, and destructive nature limit its scope. Test-
time approaches can miss out on Trojans because of the lack of observability and con-
trollability of modern ICs, the limited amount of time available for testing, and the
presence of measurement/process noise. Design-time approaches have been mostly
used to aid in run-time and test-time detection of Trojans. Although run-time mon-
itoring is flexible and can significantly improve Trojan detection/mitigation, there
has yet to be a high-quality approach with low resource overhead proposed in the
literature.
In Chapter 3, we propose a new comprehensive strategy for Trojan detection,
which attempts to overcome many of the above issues in existing research. Our
main contribution is a run-time approach with low sensing overhead that makes use
of thermal sensors. Our approach is complementary to test-time approaches and
monitors for Trojan activation at all times when the IC is in use. We also exploit
fundamental theory to deal with measurement/process noise and detect Trojans
more accurately.
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2.2 Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs)
In response to the counterfeiting and tampering attacks discussed in Chapter
1, there have been a variety of anti-cloning and anti-tampering solutions proposed
in academia as well as industry. One promising solution that covers many of these
attacks is the Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). PUFs are essentially an ex-
tension of biometrics towards physical objects. In the field on biometrics, random
physical features such as fingerprints, which are unique to each individual and diffi-
cult to remove/duplicate, have a long history of use in human identification. Simi-
larly, PUFs can be used to distinguish physical objects by extracting and comparing
their associated random characteristics.
Silicon PUFs were first proposed by researchers at MIT in [5] as a way to iden-
tify ICs. Due to variations occurring in the manufacturing process, each IC instance
of a design has slightly different physical features and performance characteristics.
A silicon PUF is a special circuit embedded in an IC that extracts the IC’s random
characteristics to generate a unique signature, identifier, or key [41, 42, 13]. Silicon
PUFs have properties that make them exceptional candidates to thwart counterfeit-
ing and physical tampering attacks [13]. First, since many of the fabrication varia-
tions are random, the unique signature generated by the PUF cannot be cloned or
replicated even by the manufacturer. Thus, in order to obtain the PUF’s signature,
one must have or have previously been in physical possession of the IC containing
the PUF. Second, the PUF technology is tamper resistant because any attempt to
physically tamper with the IC may harm the IC’s physical features and modify its
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associated performance characteristics. For example, if an attacker attempted to
steal the PUF key through microprobing, the de-metalization and delayering steps
would destroy or modify the key, thereby leaving the attacker empty-handed.
In this section, we discuss PUFs, PUF applications, and existing PUF research.
The rest of the section is organized as follows:
• Section 2.2.1 discusses some PUF terminology and several of most common
structures proposed as silicon PUFs in the literature: Arbiter PUF, Ring
Oscillator PUF (RO-PUF), and SRAM PUF.
• As discussed above, the features of PUF signatures make them promising for
many applications in hardware-assisted security. In Section 2.2.2, we highlight
the applications which have been envisioned for PUFs.
• For success in hardware security applications, the PUFs and PUF-generated
signatures should have three major properties: uniqueness, reliability, and
unpredictability. We discuss these properties as well as the metrics which
have been used in the literature to measure PUF quality in Section 2.2.3.
• The PUF properties and quality critically depend on the manufacturing vari-
ations and temporal variations experienced by the PUF/IC. Manufacturing
variations are the source of PUF quality, but are often suppressed in general-
purpose ICs. Temporal variations such as voltage supply noise, changes in
IC temperature, and aging lead to PUF reliability issues. In Sections 2.2.4.1
and 2.2.4.2, we give a high-level overview of these variations and how they
impact PUF quality.
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• In Section 2.2.5, we discuss the various architectural and circuit-based ap-
proaches that have been proposed in related work to improve PUF quality.
In general, these approaches occur during pre-fabrication or post-fabrication
steps of the IC/PUF and do not involve modeling of the actual fabrication
process or its sources of variation.
• Finally, we conclude with a summary of the section.
2.2.1 PUF Structures
In general, there are two types of silicon PUF discussed in the literature [13]:
1. Delay-based PUFs use race conditions to extract variations of wire and gate
delays to generate PUF signatures. Examples include the Arbiter and Ring
Oscillator (RO) PUFs [41] which are discussed below.
2. Memory-based PUFs exploit the random settling behavior of volatile memory
elements to generate PUF signatures. An example is the SRAM PUF [42]
which is also discussed below.
Before we discuss the operation of basic PUF structures, please make note
of the following terminology. Inputs and outputs of PUF circuits are typically
referred to as challenges and responses respectively. An applied challenge and
its measured response is referred to as a challenge-response pair (CRP). In this
dissertation, we refer to all the PUF response bits as the PUF signature.
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2.2.1.1 Arbiter PUF
The Arbiter PUF [5] was the first silicon PUF realized in an IC. The Arbiter
PUF sets up two paths (designed symmetrically for same intended path delay) and
uses a race condition to generates a 1-bit output (response) as follows. The two
paths are simultaneously asserted with an input pulse. At the end of the paths,
an “Arbiter” determines which asserted path won the race. If the pulse reaches
the output of the first path faster, the Arbiter outputs a logic 1 (HI). Otherwise, it
outputs a logic 0 (LO). The output/response depends on the delay present in both
paths and is a function of the variations experienced during IC fabrication.
The Arbiter PUF structure is shown in Figure 2.4(b). Each path consists of
a set of stages with each stage containing a switch circuit. The switch circuit is
composed of two MUXES (see Figure 2.4(a)) which are controlled by a challenge
bit. The challenge bit determines which paths the input signals shall take within
each switch. For example, with a challenge bit set as LO, the input signals will
continue to the output along their current paths. When the challenge bit is set
HI, the signals will switch paths. To illustrate, the paths to a particular challenge
are shown in Figure 2.4(c). Due to the variations occurring in the manufacturing
process, the delays of each path within the switches will vary among ICs. Hence,
the propagation time through both of the selected paths is random. The Arbiter at
the end of the paths is typically implemented with a D-latch.
While the Arbiter PUF was the first PUF proposed in the literature, a robust
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Figure 2.4: (a) Switch block constructed with MUXES controlled by challenge bit; (b) Arbiter
PUF; (c) Effects of challenge bits on paths to the arbiter.
the timing difference between the two paths has to satisfy the setup time and hold
time of the D-latch. Second, the routing of both paths must be perfectly symmetric
which can be difficult to obtain in practice [43], especially in FPGAs. Without
symmetric routing, the PUF response bits are biased towards one value (LO or HI).
Finally, it is been shown that after observing a number of CRPs, simple machine-
learning techniques can be used to predict PUF responses to unseen challenges with
relatively high accuracy [13]. This flaw could allow attackers to determine a PUF
response to a new challenge without being in possession of the IC.
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2.2.1.2 Ring Oscillator PUF (RO-PUF)
The Ring Oscillator PUF (RO-PUF) is a delay-based PUF structure that is
easier to implement than the Arbiter PUF. In this dissertation, we use the RO-PUF
in most of our examples and experimental results.
A ring oscillator (RO) circuit consists of an odd number of inverters as shown
in Figure 2.5. The oscillation frequency of an RO is determined by the total delay of
its inverters. Due to process variations, the precise frequency is random and IC de-
pendent. An RO-PUF generates signature bits by comparing oscillation frequencies
of two or more ROs. A common RO-PUF architecture is shown in Figure 2.5 [41]
and functions as follows. The RO-PUF contains a fixed number of ROs, which are
each expected to have slightly different delay/frequency due to process variation. A
challenge (input) to the RO-PUF selects two of the ROs. The frequencies of the
selected ROs are compared and the response is one bit: a logic 0 (logic 1) if the
upper (lower) RO has higher frequency than the lower (upper) RO.
The frequencies of the selected ROs can be obtained quite easily using standard
digital components. An edge detector detects the rising edges in output oscillations
and a digital counter counts the number of edges over a period of time. A comparator
can be used to compare the total number of edges (∝ frequencies) of the two ROs.
2.2.1.3 SRAM PUF
An SRAM cell is a circuit that stores one bit of information. A typical SRAM

















Figure 2.5: Ring Oscillator (RO) and Ring Oscillator PUF (RO-PUF)
(M5 and M6) as shown in Figure 2.6. During typical operation, the inverters drive
the output nodes (labeled A and A′ in Figure 2.6) to opposing logic values. The
SRAM cell stores a LO when A,A′ = 0, 1V and a HI when A,A′ = 1, 0V. The access
transistors are used to either overwrite or read the bit contained in the SRAM cell.
An SRAM cell exhibits random behavior when reset: (i) when the cell’s power
supply is off (Vdd = Vgnd), it enters into an unstable state where A = A
′ = 0V;
(ii) when power is re-applied to the cell, it transitions from the unstable state into
one of the two stable states (LO or HI). The transition to a stable state depends
on the parameters (channel length, channel width, threshold voltage, etc.) of each
transistor in the cell. Due to manufacturing variations, all these parameters are
random and result in a tendency towards one of the stable states after power is
reset. An SRAM PUF exploits the random settling behavior of a group of SRAM
cells. The challenge (input) to the PUF selects a subset of the SRAM cells to power



















Figure 2.6: SRAM cell and parameter mismatch between M1 and M3 (∆L, ∆Vth)
2.2.2 PUF Applications in Hardware Security
Silicon PUFs and their associated signatures are convenient for many applica-
tions in IC security:
1. IC Identification/Authentication: After manufacturing a device, the vendor
can record the challenge-response pairs (CRPs) of its PUF in an enrollment
phase. After deployment, a device’s identity can be verified at any time by
the vendor by applying any challenge from the enrollment phase to the PUF.
Since each PUF provides a unique response and the response can only be
measured if one has the physical device, the identity of the device is verified
as authentic when the response returned is the same as the response recorded
during the enrollment phase. To avoid replay (eavesdropping) attacks, the
selected challenge should only be used once to identify the device [13].
The above enrollment/verification procedure can be used by IC vendors to
prevent counterfeiting and overbuilding attacks (see Section 1.3)
2. Safe Encryption Key Generation/Storage: The safety of cryptographic algo-
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rithms critically depends on the secrecy of encryption keys. Traditionally, keys
are permanently stored in non-volatile memory of a device where they are sus-
ceptible to invasive attacks on memory. However, if a PUF’s response to a
unique challenge (or some derivative of its response) is used as an encryption
key [41] , then the key is physically embedded in the device rather than stored
in memory and is therefore protected against such attacks.
3. Tamper Resistance/Evidence: Many PUFs have a property that if their phys-
ical device is modified, their CRPs also change [13]. This property can keep
the key safe (i.e. self-destruction) while also determining if a device has been
tampered with in the field. By exploiting similar principles, PUF structures
have also been used [44] to identify old ICs in IC recycling attacks (see Sec-
tion 1.3.2).
Use of silicon PUFs in the above applications is not only been restricted to
research in academia. Several companies, such as Verayo and Intrinsic-ID, are also
using them [45].
2.2.3 PUF Quality and Metrics
For success in the above applications, there are three properties that are very
important for PUFs [10]:
1. Uniqueness: In order for a PUF signature to be used as a form of identity,
then for any particular challenge the difference in responses of any two PUF
instances (in separate devices) should be large. A typical measure for unique-
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where HD(ri, rj) is the hamming distance between any two responses ri and rj
from different PUFs to the same challenge C; k is the number of chips/devices
in the population under test; and m is the number of bits per response. The
optimal dinter(C) is 50%.
2. Reliability: The response of a particular PUF instance for the same challenge
may vary due to temporal variations (see Section 2.2.4.2). However, one desires
relatively stable responses so that the PUF can re-generate its key/identifier.
A common measure for reliability is mean intra-distance. This is calculated
by collecting s samples of a response at different operating conditions (supply











where ri is the nominal response of a challenge C to a PUF; r
′
i,j is the jth
sample of ri for that same challenge and same PUF instance; and m is the
number of bits per response. Ideally, dintra(C) = 0 which corresponds to no
changes in response for challenge C (i.e. perfect reliability).
3. Unpredictability: Since PUFs can be used to store secrets and cryptographic
keys, PUF responses should be unpredictable/random in order to ensure that
the secret remains safe from machine-learning attacks. Several measures of
unpredictability have been utilized in the literature. One ad-hoc approach is
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to determine how well machine learning attacks can be used to model PUF
CRPs [10]. More formal metrics such as min-entropy [47] and bit-aliasing [46]
measure randomness in the signatures.
2.2.4 IC Variations and Impact on PUFs
The above PUF properties are heavily influenced by the nature of the varia-
tions experienced during IC manufacturing and over the lifetime of the IC.
2.2.4.1 Manufacturing Process, Variations, and DFM
Variation in the IC fabrication process has a large impact on the yield and
performance of ICs as well as PUFs. IC fabrication on a silicon wafer involves three
basic steps [48]:
1. Patterning: Optical lithography and etching are used to create patterns on
the silicon wafer. In short, light is shined through a mask (which contains the
desired patterns) onto a wafer covered by a photoresist film. The portions of
the resist that receive enough light are removed by development and etching
processes.
2. Semiconductor Doping: Various regions of the silicon wafer (exposed by the
above patterning step) are selectively doped with impurities. This allows the
conductivity of the silicon to be changed when voltage is applied.
3. Film Deposition: Films of conductors and insulators are used to connect and
isolate electronic devices respectively. A chemical mechanical polishing (CMP)
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step is used to planarize the films and photoresist.
The above manufacturing steps have become more complex and difficult to
maintain with continued semiconductor scaling. As a result, there are several sources
of variability during fabrication which include CMP, optical proximity effects, lens
imperfections in the lithography system, etching precision (line edge roughness or
LER), and the number and position of dopants in the channel [48, 49]. These
variations lead to physical differences in device structures (channel length/width,
oxide thickness, etc.), differences in device electrical parameters (threshold voltage,
drain-to-source current, etc.), and also variation in device performance specifications
(timing, power).
Nature of Variations. Process variations have been modeled in the literature
as consisting of two components [49]:
1. Systematic. This component is a function of the optical lithography system,
the IC layout, chemical mechanical polishing (CMP), etc. and can be (mostly)
predicted upfront [49]. During patterning, light passing through the mask
diffracts resulting in constructive and destructive interference of light on the
wafer. This is known as the proximity effect and heavily depends on the
mask patterns [48]. Chemical mechanical polishing (CMP) is a function of
layout/mask density and results in non-planarity in the photoresist film and
light reaching the wafer out of focus (lower patterning resolution). Since the
sources of systematic variation are similar for each wafer, systematic variations
result in all instances of a chip having the same deterministic deviation from
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design specifications [46].
2. Random. The major sources of random variation include doping, etching
(LER), variation in oxide thickness, and material granularities [48, 49]. Since
these sources are orthogonal to design implementation, they result in truly un-
certain physical-parameter variations and are often modeled as random vari-
ables.
Impact of Variation on PUFs. With respect to PUF quality, recent research
has shown that the systematic type of the variations are detrimental to PUF quality
while the random variations are beneficial to PUFs [46, 50]. Intuitively, the system-
atic variations result in PUF circuity that behaves more predictably and similar
among different device instances. This has the effect of making the signatures gen-
erated by the PUF more similar (less unique) and less random. Random variations,
on the other hand, can enhance the signatures produced by the PUFs.
Design-for-Manufacturability. Since manufacturing variations increase the prob-
ability of yield loss, current chip fabrication methods (commonly referred to as
Design-for-Manufacturability or DFM [51]) attempt to generate ICs which are im-
mune to both systematic and random variations. Current DFM practices are actu-




While ICs are designed to operate at some nominal system conditions, the
conditions in which they do operate will actually change over time. Operating
conditions can be due to environmental variations (voltage supply noise and thermal
variations) as well as aging effects. Such changes can alter the underlying behavior
of the ICs [52] and therefore affect the reliability of PUF signatures.
• Voltage Supply Variation. Voltage may vary due to many reasons includ-
ing tolerances of the voltage regulator, IP drops along supply rails, and dI
dt
noise [52]. Since circuit speed is roughly proportional to voltage supply, varia-
tions will cause the IC to speed up and slow down. In the case of delay-based
PUFs which critically depend on delay, such variations will cause PUF re-
sponses and signatures to change over time. This is undesired in many PUF
applications and results in lower reliability. For example, in the RO-PUF (see
Section 2.2.1.2), voltage noise can cause the oscillation frequencies of ROs
being compared to swap their original sorted order, thereby changing the as-
sociated response bit in the PUF signature.
• Thermal Variation. Temperature across the IC is a function of the environ-
ment’s temperature (where the IC is operating) and the activity levels, power
consumption, etc. across the IC. Since delay, current, power consumption,
etc. are strong functions of temperature, thermal variations can also causes
changes in PUF signatures.
• Variations due to Aging. Aging effects are caused by phenomena such as neg-
43
ative bias temperature instability (NBTI), temperature-dependent dielectric
breakdown (TDDB), hot carrier injection (HCI) and electromigration (EM),
which are becoming more prominent with the continuous shrinking of ICs [53].
While voltage supply and thermal variations are transient in nature, aging
causes irreversible changes (oxide wear-out and interconnect failure) in circuit
components and leads to permanent shifts in IC parameters and behavior.
Experimental results in [54] show that PUF reliability decreases with aging.
2.2.5 Existing PUF Research
As discussed above, PUF quality critically depends on the PUF’s ability to gen-
erate signatures that are simultaneously: (i) different between IC instances (unique
and unpredictable/random) and (ii) the same for a given IC instance under dif-
ferent operating conditions (reliable). In an effort to improve the uniqueness, un-
predictability, and reliability of PUF signatures, researchers have investigated new
architectural designs, circuit designs, and post-fabrication processing elements.
2.2.5.1 Architectures
New PUF structures and architectures have been proposed to improve PUF
quality. For example, [55] and [41] proposed feed-forward and XOR-based Arbiter
PUF architectures that increase randomness and nonlinearity of responses for better
resistance to machine-learning attacks. Mecca PUF [56] utilizes SRAM write fail-
ures to produce PUF signatures that are more reliable and random. [46] explored
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proximity-based methods for selecting ROs in order to reduce the impact of system-
atic variations in the RO-PUF. [57] generated ternary numbers using unreliable bits
in memory-based PUFs to improve PUF signature entropy (unpredictability).
Others have proposed PUF architectures that have lower implementation over-
heads and better features. For instance, [58] is a hybrid delay-memory based PUF
implemented with a ring of inverters that produced a larger number of CRPs com-
pared to existing PUFs. [59] proposed a fast, low-power PUF that relied on a sense
amplifier architecture. Finally, [60] proposed a new memory-based PUF called the
Butterfly PUF which, unlike the SRAM PUF, does not require removal of power to
generate response bits.
2.2.5.2 Circuits
Aside from architectures, several groups have proposed circuit designs that
are less sensitive to systematic variations or more sensitive to random fabrication
variations. For example, the authors in [61] improved the Arbiter PUF uniqueness
by careful choice of sub-threshold parameters. The current starved inverter was
proposed as a new element in delay-based PUFs [62] for its high sensitivity to random
fabrication variations.
Other groups have examined new circuit designs that are more robust in the
face of environmental variations. For example, in [63], the authors use feedback from
thermal sensors to dynamically adjust voltage supplies in the RO-PUF and prevent
signature bits from flipping due to thermal variations. [64] looks at two ways to im-
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prove PUF reliability across thermal variations. First, they choose an optimal (fixed)
supply voltage which can effectively balance out the changes in threshold voltage
and mobility cause by thermal variation. Second, they use feedback polysilicon
resistances to create temperature insensitive drain currents in delay-based PUFs.
2.2.5.3 Post-fabrication
There has also been a great deal of work devoted towards dealing with temporal
variations and systematic fabrication variations once the IC/PUFs are fabricated.
While PUF reliability was dealt with above by reducing circuit noise levels,
one can also deal with them after fabrication. In such approaches, one accepts
that some level of noise will always exist in the PUF signatures and overcomes
it by storing redundant helper data and employing error correction schemes. The
key challenge is to make sure that no secret bits of the PUF signature/key are
leaked by the helper data. For example, “fuzzy extractors” [65] have utilized helper
data and hash functions to regenerate keys without revealing PUF output. “Fuzzy
embedders” [66, 67] have been used to embed keys and reliably regenerate them
using PUF responses. Soft information that measures the confidence of bits in the
key has also been applied to enhance PUF reliability [68, 69, 70]. Finally, schemes
that model the changes in delay/frequency of PUFs caused by temperature and then
adjust the PUF output to compensate for the current temperature have also been
investigated [71].
Recently, groups have begun investigating ways to counteract systematic varia-
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tions within fabricated PUFs by adding compensation hardware to the PUF. In [72],
the authors proposed a programmable delay line (PDL) that tunes the delay bias in
Arbiter PUFs caused by asymmetric routing in FPGAs. The PDL is also used to
determine challenges that are more robust against environmental variations for each
PUF instance. Their results show that they can achieve close to ideal uniformity
(randomness measure) with 14 tuning blocks added to an arbiter PUF. In [50], the
authors estimate the systematic variation within an RO-PUF by solving an overde-
termined system of equations using the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. The
systematic biases are corrected using an entropy distiller for two challenges. Their
proposed approach improves the randomness (NIST tests [73]) in PUF responses
when 2nd order and 3rd order polynomials are used to estimate the systematic
portion of oscillation frequencies.
2.2.6 Summary
While manufacturing variations are undesirable in general-purpose ICs and
typically suppressed by Design-for-Manufacturability (DFM), silicon PUFs rely on
random variations to be successful against hardware-based attacks. Thus, there
has been a great deal of work geared towards improving PUF quality by enhancing
uniqueness, unpredictability, and reliability of PUF signatures.
There have been three basic directions for improving PUF quality in existing
work: new architectural designs, new circuit designs, and additional post-fabrication
processing hardware. The architectures have tried to extract signatures with greater
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randomness and less biases. Circuit level approaches have attempted to increase
sensitivity to random process variations and/or reduce sensitivity to noise. Post-
processing has mostly been used to correct noise in the PUF signatures from tem-
poral variations. While all these approaches have met with success, they require
larger overheads (area, power, etc.) than necessary since they have to overcome the
suppression of random variations by DFM.
In Chapters 4 and 5, we propose innovative techniques [74, 75] that improve
PUF quality by focusing more heavily on the source of IC variations: the manufac-
turing process. In doing so, our approaches can improve PUF quality at low design
cost while also complimenting prior approaches.
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Chapter 3
Temperature Tracking for Run-time Detection of Trojans
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Motivation
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, hardware Trojans pose a very serious threat
because they have the ability to subvert both software- and hardware-based security
measures. As a result, there has been a strong initiative in academia, industry, etc.
to develop ways to mitigate hardware Trojan attacks. Detection approaches have
been proposed at all three stages of the IC lifecycle: design-time, test-time, and run-
time. The majority of existing schemes occur at test-time, but flaws in test-time
approaches can allow Trojan-infected ICs to end up being deployed.
• Inactive Trojans. Inputs to the Trojan trigger are often chosen carefully by the
attacker to prevent accidental Trojan triggering during test-time. Since there
is only a limited amount of time to perform tests, the Trojan may remain
inactive/dormant and hence, will not cause any changes to the IC’s logical
behavior.
• Small Triggers. While Trojan triggers have been used in the past to detect
Trojan presence, very small triggers (eg. one gate [76]) can be difficult to
detect because their impact on side-channels (delay, power, etc.) is negligible
49
and can easily be masked by process variation and measurement noise.
• Low Impact on Side Channels. The impact of the Trojan payload on side-
channels can also be masked while the Trojan is inactive. As discussed in [76],
the trigger can be used to “power gate” [52] the payload, which effectively
minimizes its impact on power consumption and delay.
The above flaws have motivated others to investigate run-time approaches to com-
pliment test-time detection. Simply put, since run-time approaches can be utilized
for the entire lifetime of the IC, they can overcome many of the shortcomings of test-
time approaches. While a Trojan-inserted IC’s behavior may be indistinguishable
from a Trojan-free IC’s while the Trojan is inactive, at some point during run-time
the Trojan will have to be activated in order to attack the IC. When a Trojan is
activated at run-time, its attack may have much larger impact on both logical and
side-channel behavior, thereby enabling easier detection.
As a motivating example, we compare power consumption of Trojan-free,
Trojan-inactive, and Trojan-active ICs for a publicly available Trojan benchmark:
RS232-T900 from trust-HUB [21]. RS232-T900 is a micro-UART core with a Trojan
inserted in its transmitter. The Trojan is triggered by a sequence of four transmis-
sion messages and its payload prevents any further transmission.
We determined power and layout information for each of the RS232-T900
design instances by using state-of-the-art Cadence software. First, switching activity
was recorded for the Trojan-free, Trojan-inactive, and Trojan-active instances by
simulating each in Cadence SimVision. Next, Cadence RTL Compiler was used
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Figure 3.1: Avg. power consumption (nW) in a 250µs time window across Trojan-inactive and
Trojan-active ICs for the RS232-T900 benchmark.
to convert the Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted designs to netlists. Then, with the
switching activity, we obtained estimates of power consumption for the netlists of
all three instances. Finally, we determined the cell layout and spatial distribution
of power for each instance by performing place-and-route in Cadence Encounter.
Between the Trojan-free and Trojan-inactive cases, we found little difference
in the spatial distribution of power and only a 3% difference in total power con-
sumption. The difference in power is mainly due to the switching activity in the
Trojan trigger (which does not exist in the Trojan-free design). A 3% difference is
challenging to detect at test-time, especially in the presence of measurement noise
and process variation. In contrast, the spatial distribution of power consumption
of Trojan-inactive and Trojan-active ICs is shown in Figure 3.1. Comparing these
two cases, one can see that the power differs in the upper left quadrant where the
transmitter hardware is located. Once the Trojan is triggered (Trojan-active case),
the Trojan payload blocks transmission. The Trojan-inactive instance, on the other
hand, transmits and receives data at all times. Overall, there is a 30% decrease in
total power consumption after the Trojan is triggered. Such a change should be
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significantly easier to observe, thereby enabling better Trojan detection.
3.1.2 Main Contributions
The above results demonstrate that run-time monitoring of power can be
very effective for detecting Trojans. Unfortunately, as previously discussed in Sec-
tion 2.1.2.3, such approaches have very large resource overheads. Thus, their use in
practical applications has been limited.
In this chapter, we propose an innovative low-overhead solution for Trojan
detection at run-time. Our approach explores a new side channel for Trojan de-
tection: temperature1. Simply put, Trojans can cause significant changes in power
consumption after activation which will also be reflected in the IC’s thermal profile.
In contrast to prior run-time approaches, temperature-based Trojan detection has
much lower sensing overhead because many electronic systems are already equipped
with thermal sensors (e.g. AMD Operton processor has 38 sensors). Thermal sen-
sors are heavily utilized for dynamic thermal management (DTM) to prevent IC
reliability issues and excessive power consumption. By exploiting these existing
sensors, we can amortize the cost of detecting Trojans at run-time.
Our main contributions are summarized as follows:
• We propose a comprehensive framework for temperature-based Trojan detec-
tion which consists of design-time, test-time, and run-time phases. In the
1As of this writing, there is only one other paper [77] that uses temperature to detect Trojans.
Their work was developed in parallel with ours and, in contrast to ours, is a test-time Trojan
detection approach.
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design phase, we statistically characterize an IC’s power/thermal dynamics
and optimally place thermal sensors. The test-time phase is used to calibrate
each IC to account for fabrication variation. The run-time phase integrates
the information from the previous phases with thermal sensor measurements
to detect Trojan activation.
• We propose two mechanisms to detect Trojan activation during run-time. The
first is a local sensor-based approach that uses information from thermal sen-
sors, statistical information provided by the test phase, and hypothesis testing.
The second is a global approach that exploits correlation between sensors and
maintains track of the IC’s thermal profile using a Kalman filter (KF). Devi-
ations from the “expected” thermal profile are used to detect the presence of
Trojans.
• We test our detection mechanisms on five publicly available Trojan bench-
marks (from [21]) and use state-of-the-art Cadence simulation tools to compute
power/thermal profiles. In all but one benchmark, the proposed approaches
are capable of detecting Trojan activation quickly (on the order of millisec-
onds) and with very few false-positives.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, we dis-
cuss how thermal sensors and predictive models have been used in prior work for
dynamic thermal management and to track temperature. Our specific problem and
its challenges are clearly defined in Section 3.3. The proposed framework and de-
tection mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.4. Experimental results are discussed
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Figure 3.2: Basic thermal sensor circuit




Thermal sensors are heavily utilized for dynamic thermal management (DTM)
to prevent IC reliability issues [78] and excessive power consumption [79, 80]. For
example, the AMD Opteron multicore processor is equipped with 38 thermal sen-
sors [81]. A basic thermal sensor, consisting of a ring oscillator (RO), counter, and
encoder, is shown in Figure 3.2 [82] and functions as follows. The oscillation fre-
quency of the RO is a function of temperature. The counter measures the oscillation
frequency by counting the output pulses from the RO over a fixed period of time.
The encoder then converts the count to a temperature value. Since it consists of ba-
sic digital components, this thermal sensor can easily be added to processor, ASIC,
and FPGA designs.
Basic DTM approaches are reactive in nature. If the temperature of a sensor
exceeds a predefined threshold (typically around 80oC), DTM will trigger one or
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more mechanisms to cool the IC at the sensor’s location. While reactive approaches
can be effective, they also have shortcomings:
• Limited # of Sensors. Since thermal sensors take up space in the design
and consume power, they cannot be placed everywhere leaving some locations
less observable. Hence, thermal hotspots at locations without sensors can be
missed.
• Measurement Noise. Since the thermal sensor is a circuit, it is susceptible to
noise in the voltage supply (see Section 2.2.4.2). This noise will have an impact
on the RO’s oscillation frequency and will cause the sensor’s temperature
measurement to be noisy. With the thermal sensor being used to trigger
cooling, the noise may cause certain hotspots to be missed or cause the DTM
to overreact.
To overcome the above issues, recent DTM research [83, 84] has tried to com-
bine the sensor measurements with predictive thermal models such as the RC ther-
mal model which is discussed below.
3.2.2 RC Thermal Model
Temperature is a strong function of power consumption. Hence, if one knows
the power profile of chip, the IC’s thermal profile can be estimated. One popular
method for predicting temperature in academia is the RC thermal model [80].
In the RC model, the IC is divided into grids and the temperature and power
consumption of each grid at time t are represented as constants (see Figure 3.3). A
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Figure 3.3: IC broken into grids and RC thermal model within dotted region
circuit is used to estimate the IC’s thermal profile where node voltage and circuit
current are analogous to temperature and power/heat flow in each grid. Voltage
ground is analogous to the environment’s ambient temperature. Thermal capaci-
tance and thermal resistance between neighboring nodes determine how heat flows
between nodes/grids of the IC. Temperature for the entire IC can be determined by





(Ti(t)− Tj(t)) + Ci dTi(t)dt − Pi(t) = 0 ∀i (3.1)
where Ti(t) and Pi(t) are the temperature and power dissipated at node i and time
t; Ci denotes thermal capacitance at node i; Rij denotes thermal resistance between
nodes i and j; and Ni is the set of all neighbors for node i. The above equations are
often written in a discrete matrix form [85]:
T⃗ [k] = AT⃗ [k − 1] +BP⃗ [k − 1] (3.2)
where T⃗ [k] and P⃗ [k] are temperature and power vectors (each element corresponds
to one node/grid) at discrete timestep k; A and B are coefficient matrices that
depend upon the RC circuit and timestep duration.
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By combining the predictive RC thermal model with sensor measurements, the
issues above associated with reactive DTM (limited number of sensors, measurement
noise) can be overcome. For instance, recent DTM approaches [83, 84] have used a
Kalman Filter (KF) to merge prior knowledge of power consumption and statistical
noise characteristics with run-time sensor measurements to obtain optimal thermal
profile estimates of the entire IC over time.
In this chapter, we exploit the key features of thermal sensors, the RC thermal
model, and the Kalman Filter (KF) to detect unexpected changes in IC power/temperature
caused by active Trojans. Temperature-based Trojan detection is a relatively un-
explored avenue which should have lower overheads compared to previous run-time
approaches.
3.3 Problem Definition and Challenges
Our problem is inspired by the example discussed in Section 3.1.1 (RS232-
T900). We assume that there are three possible states that an electronic system
or IC can be in: Trojan-free, Trojan-inactive, and Trojan-active. Each state is
defined by a set of statistical characteristics Sf , Si, Sa respectively. The Trojan-free
and Trojan-inactive characteristics, while not necessarily identical, are close enough
such that the Trojan-inserted IC can evade test-time Trojan detection methods (i.e.
Sf ≈ Si). The Trojan-active characteristics Sa on the other hand differ significantly
from the other two. Our goal is a run-time temperature-based approach that can
detect changes from Sf and Si to Sa after the Trojan is activated. Note, we are not
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concerned with Trojan-inactive ICs since, prior to Trojan activation, they essentially
provide the same functionality as Trojan-free ICs. Stated formally, our problem is
as follows:
Given two hypotheses of the system’s state:
H0 The state is Trojan-free or Trojan-inactive
H1 The state is Trojan-active
Use thermal sensor observations to determine if the IC’s state (characteristics)
correspond to H0 (Sf , Si) or H1 (Sa).
The above problem has various challenges to overcome some of which are
specific to temperature tracking and some of which are common to Trojan detection:
• Golden IC/model. Most Trojan detection approaches rely on the existence
of a “golden model” to distinguish Trojan-free and Trojan-inserted ICs. In
our case, we assume that the Trojan-free design is given and from it we can
compute Sf characteristics to function as our golden model.
• Autonomous detection. Since the Sf characteristics are known and Sf ≈ Si,
we should be able to easily track temperature for Trojan-free and Trojan-
inactive designs as in prior work. The challenge is detecting active Trojan ICs
because the Sa characteristics are unknown. We propose two mechanisms for
detecting Trojan activation at run-time.
• Sensor Infrastructure and Noise. Prior work has shown that sensor placement,
number of sensors, sensor noise, etc. have a profound impact on temperature
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tracking [82]. In this chapter, we vary the number of sensors to see the im-
pact on temperature-based Trojan detection. One of our approaches uses the
Kalman Filter which explicitly accounts for measurement noise.
• Fabrication Variation (FV). FV makes it more challenging to track tempera-
ture as well as detect Trojans. For tracking, FV results in larger uncertainty in
the estimated thermal profile [84]. For Trojan detection, FV makes it difficult
to distinguish between deviations in power/temperature due to manufacturing
and Trojan presence [31]. In our approach, calibration is performed for each
IC to ensure robustness in the face of FV.
3.4 Temperature-Based Detection
In this section, we discuss the overall framework and algorithms for our temperature-
based Trojan detection. While detection itself occurs at run-time, the approach itself
is comprehensive in nature with each phase of the IC supply chain/process playing
a critical role. Namely, offline profiling steps at design-time and test-time are used
to deal with many of the challenges discussed in the previous section. An overview
of entire approach with design, test, and run-time phases is shown in Figure 3.4.
The details of each phase are discussed below.
Assumptions. Before we begin, please make note of the following assumptions.
As discussed above, side channel-based Trojan detection often relies on a “golden”
model or IC. Our approach assumes that we have access to the Trojan-free design
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Figure 3.4: Phases of the Proposed Approach
activity, power consumption, thermal dynamics, etc. For simplicity, we shall also
assume that the statistical characteristics are Gaussian. In general, this a valid
assumption due to the central limit theorem (CLT) which states that the statistical
characteristics of a sufficiently large number of independent random variables will be
approximately normally distributed. Note, however, that our detection approaches
are very general and can be extended to deal with other statistical characteristics as
well.
3.4.1 Design Phase
Design Profiling. We profile the Trojan-free designs using the RC thermal
model (see Section 3.2.2), benchmarks, and either state-of-the-art simulation tools
or prototype ICs. The RC thermal model divides the power consumed by the design
into grids and uses a vector P⃗ to represent power consumed in the grids. The
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statistical approaches for temperature tracking and Trojan detection used in this
chapter require probability distribution functions (PDFs) to summarize the design’s
expected power and/or temperature. Benchmarks that are representative of the
design’s expected workload along with simulation tools are used to estimate the
PDFs. Alternatively, IC prototypes that are verified as Trojan-free can be used. We
approximate the PDFs as Gaussian with mean vectors µ⃗p and µ⃗T and covariance
matrices Qp and QT (for power and temperature respectively).
Sensor Placement. We adopt the sensor placement approach from [82] which
uses the temperature covariance matrix QT . Specifically, sensors are placed in a










where qi,j denotes the element at location i and j of matrix QT (i.e. correlation in
temperature between IC grids i and j). The cost captures how much information
is provided by sensors in selected locations and encourages sensor placement at
locations that have high correlation with other locations and are not yet covered by
a sensor. It has been shown that using this approach improves thermal estimation
accuracy [82].
3.4.2 Test Phase
When the design phase is complete, we fabricate the ICs. At this point, we
assume that some Trojan-inserted ICs are fabricated and inserted into the supply
chain.
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IC Parameter Calibration. Fabrication variation (FV) results in ICs that have
different physical, electrical, and performance parameters from the nominal design.
As discussed above, FV makes it more challenging to accurately detect Trojans and
track temperature. To ensure robustness, we must have accurate power/thermal
statistics (µ⃗p, µ⃗T , Qp, QT ) for each IC under test (ICUT). One can accomplish this
by applying test vectors to the ICUT, measuring power consumption, and estimat-
ing the PDFs after fabrication. For example, gate-level characterization has been
applied in prior work [31] to successfully profile IC gate parameters. Temperature-
based approaches which utilize infrared cameras [77] and Expectation Maximization
(EM) [86] are also applicable.
Test-time Detection. One can argue that our temperature-based approach may
not be able to detect all types of Trojans. For example, Trojans that are only active
for a few clock cycles may not have a large impact on power and/or temperature.
This is why we emphasize an integrated framework as shown in Figure 3.4. Prior
test-time detection schemes are used during this phase to remove Trojan-inserted
ICs (that might be missed by our approach) before they are deployed. The proposed
run-time approach would then complement test-time approaches by detecting the




As discussed in Section 3.3, our main problem is to decide the correct hypoth-
esis (state of the system): H0 or H1. In other words, is the IC Trojan-free/Trojan-
inactive or Trojan-active? In this section, we propose two mechanisms to solve the
problem. The first is a local sensor-based approach that uses an hypothesis testing
(HT) framework and Bayesian decision theory. The second is a global approach that
exploits correlation between sensors and maintains track of the IC’s thermal profile
with a Kalman filter (KF).
3.4.3.1 Local Sensor Approach
For simplicity, let us suppose we have one sensor measurement at timestep k
denoted by S[k] from which we shall decide the state (we’ll consider more sensors
later). In an hypothesis testing (HT) framework, one assumes that S[k] can only
come from one of two PDFs: S0 or S1 which correspond to null and alternative
hypotheses respectively.
In our case, the null and alternative hypotheses correspond to the IC thermal
state in Trojan-free/Trojan-inactive (H0) and Trojan-active ICs (H1) respectively.
We shall choose the correct state as the one with the highest probability of oc-
currence given S[k] (i.e. argmaxP (Hx
∣∣S[k]), x ∈ {0, 1}). By applying Bayesian
decision theory, it can be shown the optimal decision is [87]:




∣∣H0) > P (H0)P (H1) (3.4)
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Otherwise, choose H0 (Trojan-inactive state).
where P (x) and p(x
∣∣y) denote the prior probability of x and probability of x given
y respectively.
While the above decision rule is theoretically sound, it is difficult to directly
apply to our problem for two reasons.
• One cannot assume that all measurements come from single stationary PDF
(i.e. one that is time invariant) since the IC temperature varies with time.
• Even if the PDFs were stationary, we do not have access to the Trojan-active
design and therefore cannot accurately estimate p(S[k]
∣∣H1) or P (H1).
We get around these issues by making the following simplifying assumptions.
Stable State Temperature. The first issue no longer presents a problem when
the IC’s temperature has reached a stable state. Put simply, if an IC’s power con-
sumption is similar for a long period of time, the IC’s temperature will end up
converging to a “stable state” [88] where measurements of its thermal state are ac-
tually samples from a stationary PDF. In our approach, we assume that we have a
verified Trojan-free design/IC (see Section 2.1.2.1) and benchmarks that can charac-
terize the IC’s activity. We can then run the benchmarks on the verified Trojan-free
design/IC until reaching the stable state. From there, we take measurements and
approximate p(S[k]
∣∣H0), as Gaussian with mean µ0 and variance σ20.
Trojan PDF Estimate: To overcome the second issue, we exploit the fact that
S0 and S1 must be slightly different and assume a simple Trojan attack model.
Specifically, we assume that the mean of p(S[k]
∣∣H1) (µ1) differs from p(S[k]∣∣H0)’s
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known mean (µ0) by some fixed percentage difference S% and both possess the same
variance (σ0 = σ1.) If S% < 0 (S% > 0), Trojan activation causes the IC to lose
(gain) some functionality. While this assumption is imperfect, it’s simply the best
we can do to apply the theory since we have little if any knowledge of the actual
Trojan-active design/attack. Moreover, it does allow us to make optimal guarantees
for Trojan detection. If the assumed statistics hold, then we can optimally detect
the active Trojan. Furthermore, if the H1 statistics differ from the H0 statistics by
more than S%, we can also probably detect the Trojan.
Single sensor Decision Rule. With the above assumptions, we now have enough
information to apply the optimal decision rule in Eqn. (3.4). For simplicity, we












, x ∈ {0, 1} (3.5)
With the above, one can easily solve Eqn. (3.4) w.r.t. thermal measurement S[k]
to determine the test statistic [87] (i.e. a hypothesis test specified in terms of
temperature)
Choose H1 (Trojan-active state) when:
S[k] ∈ R1 (3.6)
Otherwise, choose H0 (Trojan-inactive state).
In the above equation, R1 defines a set of temperature values belonging to the
Trojan-active state H1. If the sensor measurement S[k] is from R1, then the IC’s
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Figure 3.5: Local Hypothesis Testing (HT) Approach with z sensors and m× n grid
single mode Gaussian PDFs assumed in this chapter, Eqn. (3.6) can be simplified to
either S[k] < r1 or S[k] > r1 (depending on the sign of S%) where r1 is a threshold
value. Nevertheless, the theory and associated decision rule are general enough to
handle other PDFs as well.
Multi-sensor Decision Rule. For multiple sensors, we can easily extend the
above rule by collecting the sensor measurements as a vector S⃗[k] and using multi-
variate Gaussian PDFs. For simplicity, we take a simple ad-hoc approach instead.
We evaluate Eqn. (3.6) for each sensor and come to decision (H0 or H1) by majority
voting.
Overheads. A high-level overview of the local HT approach and its overheads
is shown in Figure 3.5. HT’s offline overhead includes computing the optimal test-
statistics (R1) for each sensor. At run-time, a simple circuit determines if the sensor
measurement is in the sensor’s corresponding R1 and outputs a 1-bit vote. Note that
for the single mode Gaussian PDFs assumed in this paper, the circuit one needs to
implement is a simple comparator. Majority voting is used to combine the decisions
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of z sensors and obtain a final decision. All these operations are simple and the
overall complexity depends only on the number of sensors z.
3.4.3.2 Global (Kalman Filter-based) Approach
Our second approach is a global approach that exploits correlation between
sensors and uses a Kalman Filter (KF) to dynamically track the system’s thermal
profile at run-time. An autocorrelation based metric then decides between hypothe-
ses H0 and H1 (Trojan-free/Trojan-inactive and Trojan-active).
Temperature Tracking Via Kalman Filter. We track IC temperature at run-
time using the standard Kalman filtering (KF) approach developed in prior work [83,
84]. For simplicity, we only consider dynamic power, but leakage power can be
handled as well [89]. The KF relies on a state-space equation to model the random
dynamics of the state being estimated and on a measurement equation to relate mea-
surements with the state being estimated. The state-space equation for temperature
tracking is the discrete form RC thermal model equation discussed in Section 3.2.2
(copied below for convenience)
T⃗ [k] = AT⃗ [k − 1] +BP⃗ [k − 1] (3.7)
The above equation assumes that the current thermal state T⃗ [k] depends on the
previous thermal state T⃗ [k− 1] (Markovian assumption) and also local power dissi-
pation P⃗ [k−1]. Due to variations in the voltage supply noise, system workload, etc.,
the power P⃗ is random at each timestep and T⃗ [k] cannot be precisely computed with
the state-space model alone. To improve the estimate, the KF uses measurements
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collected by thermal sensors and the following measurement model
S⃗[k] = HT⃗ [k] + v⃗[k] (3.8)
where S⃗[k] is a vector of sensor measurements at timestep k; H is a transformation
matrix based on the sensor placement; and v⃗[k] is a Gaussian random vector with
zero mean and known covariance R [83] representing measurement noise.
The KF estimates the thermal state of a chip as follows. P⃗ [k] is modeled
as a Gaussian random vector2 with known mean µ⃗p and covariance Qp (which we
determine in the design/test phases). KF estimation is then performed recursively
with predict and update steps. In the predict step, the KF uses µ⃗p and the previous
temperature estimate to predict the IC’s new thermal state. In the update step, the
KF corrects this estimate based on new sensor measurements. This predict-update
2Note that while Gaussian distributions are assumed for power/temperature by the KF in this
paper, prior work [85, 86] has shown that the KF framework can be extended to handle a mixture
of Gaussians (MOGs) for more general PDFs. Such approaches can easily account for multiple
power profiles, modes of IC operation, etc. For simplicity, we assume a single Gaussian PDF in
this paper, but shall evaluate MOGs for Trojan detection in future work.
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process is shown in Figure 3.6 and described by the following equations:
predict: T⃗ [k|k − 1] = AT⃗ [k|k − 1] +Bµ⃗p (3.9)
C[k|k − 1] = AC[k|k − 1]AT +BQpBT (3.10)
update: e⃗[k] = S⃗[k]−HT⃗ [k
∣∣k − 1] (3.11)
T⃗ [k|k] = T⃗ [k|k − 1] +K[k]e⃗[k] (3.12)
K[k] = C[k|k − 1]HT (R+HC[k|k − 1]HT )−1 (3.13)
C[k|k] = (I−K[k]H)C[k|k − 1] (3.14)
T⃗ [k|k] and T⃗ [k|k−1] are estimates of the temperature at timestep k computed with
and without sensor information respectively; C[k|k − 1] and C[k|k] are the error
covariance matrices associated with T⃗ [k|k − 1] and T⃗ [k|k]; e⃗[k] is the KF residual
which reflects the discrepancy between the predicted and actual measurements; I
is the identity matrix; K[k] represents the Kalman gain at the kth step and is
chosen to minimize the error in T⃗ [k|k]. First, Eqn. (3.9) is used to compute a
prediction of the temperature (T⃗ [k|k−1]). Then, Eqn. (3.12) updates the prediction
(T⃗ [k
∣∣k− 1] → T⃗ [k∣∣k]) based on the residual (Eqn. (3.11)). The filter also generates
error covariance matrices associated with T⃗ [k|k− 1] and T⃗ [k|k] which keep track of
the error in the thermal estimates and are computed based on the power and sensor
noise covariance matrices (Qp and R).
Steady State Kalman Filter. When the statistical characteristics of P⃗ and
measurement noise are fixed (or do not change for a relatively long time), the KF
stabilizes which means C[k|k − 1],C[k|k], and K[k] converge to static values. This







Figure 3.6: KF-based Temperature Tracking
temperature may change with time, the error associated with the estimates remains
the same. The steady state allows one to create low overhead implementations of
the KF [84] by replacing C[k|k − 1],C[k|k], and K[k] in Eqns. (3.9) to (3.14) by
constants.
Autocorrelation-based Detection Rule. While the KF can be used to accu-
rately track temperature, we also need a rule to decide on the correct state (H0 or
H1). Our decision rule is based on the KF residual and uses the autocorrelation
function of the residual process. In the KF, residual e⃗[k] represents the discrepancy
between the predicated temperature and thermal sensor measurements. If e⃗[k] is
small (large), the two agree (disagree) on the thermal state. Assuming the state-
space model/parameters and the sensor noise covariance are reasonably accurate,
the autocorrelation of the residual should be close to zero on average [90]. When a
Trojan gets activated, the state-space model (which does not account for the power
of an active Trojan) becomes less accurate and should cause the autocorrelation to
diverge from zero.
We use the following method to detect a Trojan at timestep x. We record the
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Figure 3.7: Global Kalman Filter (KF) Approach with z sensors and m× n grid







e⃗[i] · e⃗[i− 1]T
)
(3.15)
This cost is the average autocorrelation of the residual process in the lastN timesteps.
To decide if a Trojan is activated, we define thresholds aT and V . If (|â[x]| > aT )
for more than V consecutive timesteps, we assume a Trojan has been activated (i.e.
state H1). aT and V are parameters that tune the aggressiveness of the decision
rule.
Overheads. A high-level overview of the KF approach and its overheads is
shown in Figure 3.7. The main offline overheads are estimating the power statis-
tics (µ⃗p and Qp) and computing the steady state Kalman gain matrix K. During
run-time, the KF performs some matrix-vector multiplications and vector addi-
tions/subtractions (Eqns. (3.9), (3.11), (3.12)) at each timestep k. The size of the
matrices/vectors and complexity of these operations depend on the number of grids
in the RC thermal model (mn) and the number of sensors (z). Running averages of
the autocorrelation â for the last V timesteps must be stored and the final state is
chosen based on V + 1 thresholding operations.
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3.4.3.3 Qualitative Comparison
The salient differences between the above two detection mechanisms are as
follows:
• Stable State Assumption: The local hypothesis testing (HT) approach requires
the system under test to be in a stable thermal state so that the sensor mea-
surements can be compared with stationary PDFs. The global Kalman Filter
(KF) approach works with the system in any thermal state since it tracks the
system’s thermal profile at all timesteps.
• Sensor Correlation: The local HT approach compares each sensor measure-
ment with its corresponding stable state PDF in an independent fashion.
Correlation between the sensors is not exploited and the final decision is made
based on a majority vote. The global KF approach exploits the correlation
between sensors to accurately track temperature and detect Trojans.
• Run-time Overheads: The KF approach clearly has larger run-time overheads
than the HT approach (see Figs. 3.5 and 3.7). While the HT approach primar-
ily works with scalar values and computes 1-bit decisions, the KF approach
requires matrix-vector storage and computations which are more expensive
(O(mn)).
72
3.5 Experiments and Discussion
3.5.1 Setup
Benchmarks. We tested our Trojan detection schemes on five publicly available
Trojan benchmarks (from trust-HUB [21]):
1. RS232-T900 was discussed in Section 3.1.1.
2. s38417-T300 contains a Trojan trigger with activation probability of 1.7e-44.
Once activated, the payload leaks the value of a specific net through a 29 stage
ring oscillator.
3. BasicRSA-T200 is an RSA encoder with a Trojan triggered by a specific plain-
text input. The payload permanently disables encoding of the plaintext.
4. MC8051-T300 is an implementation of the 8051 microprocessor with a Trojan.
The Trojan is triggered when a specific string is sent through the UART and
the payload blocks new messages from the UART.
5. MC8051-T600 is another implementation of the 8051 microprocessor with a
Trojan. The Trojan is activated by an external interrupt and disables 8051
instructions containing jumps.
We determined power and layout information in the above benchmarks by simulat-
ing, synthesizing, and placing each design with Cadence SimVision, RTL Compiler,
and Encounter tools for two different testbench instances: one which activates the
Trojan (i.e. Trojan-active) and one which does not (i.e. Trojan-inactive). The
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Benchmark RS232-T900 s38417-T300 BasicRSA-T200 MC8051-T300 MC8051-T600
% difference -39.97% 54.33% -28.40% -1.5% -72.16%
Table 3.1: % difference in total power consumption between Trojan-inactive and Trojan-active
in 250ms experiment
difference in power consumption between the two is shown in Table 3.1 for all the
benchmarks. In all cases but one (MC8051-T300) there is a % difference larger than
25%.
Temperature-based Trojan Detection. We divided the IC into 20 by 16 grids
(320 distinct regions). In the design phase, we computed power and temperature
statistics using 250ms of data generated by Cadence (from the Trojan-free designs)
and the RC thermal model [80]. With the resulting statistics, we placed sensors
as discussed in Section 3.4.1. The number of sensors we tested were 4, 16, and 32.
For simplicity, we ignored fabrication variation and therefore did not implement the
test phase. For the run-time phase, we computed “real” dynamic thermal profiles
using the RC thermal model. A steady state Kalman filter (KF) implementation
was used to estimate the thermal profile for Trojan-active and Trojan-inactive cases.
Sensor measurements were made by overlaying noise onto the “real” thermal profile.
We assumed sensor noise variance of 0.1 which seems like a worst-case for state-of-
the-art thermal sensors [91]. For KF-based Trojan detection, we stored N = 50
residuals and chose autocorrelation thresholds V = 10 and aT = .18, .34, .40 for 4,
16, and 32 sensors respectively (based on data from the Trojan-free designs). For
the hypothesis testing (HT) approach, we used mean difference S% = ±2.5% to
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RS232-T900 s38417-T300 BasicRSA-T200 MC8051-T300 MC8051-T600
# sensors t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec t+ f+ tdec
HT
4 100% 79% 4.9E-2 100% 45% 1.9E-3 100% 66% 1.7E-2 0% 0% - 100% 66% 5.2E-2
16 100% 0% 1.7E-1 100% 0% 4.3E-3 100% 0% 3.9E-2 0% 0% - 100% 0% 1.6E-1
32 100% 0% 2.1E-1 100% 0% 5.1E-3 100% 0% 4.8E-2 0% 0% - 100% 0% 2.0E-1
KF
4 100% 0% 1.0E-3 100% 0% 3.6E-3 100% 0% 8.3E-3 1% 1% 1.2E-2 100% 0% 3.7E-2
16 100% 0% 8.3E-4 100% 0% 2.7E-3 100% 0% 6.3E-3 3% 3% 1.1E-2 100% 0% 3.2E-2
32 100% 0% 5.9E-4 100% 0% 2.2E-3 100% 0% 5.2E-3 7% 7% 1.0E-2 100% 0% 2.4E-2
Table 3.2: Average true positive rate t+, false positive rate f+, and detection time tdec
(seconds) for 100 trials. Note detection time is given in seconds and only includes true positives.
‘-’ indicates no true positives.
estimate the Trojan-active stable state PDF S1. Except where specified, one can
assume the experiments were conducted while the ICs were in stable thermal states.
3.5.2 Results
We conducted 100 trials with random sensor noise on both the Trojan-inactive
and Trojan-active ICs. We recorded the following data: average true positive rate
t+, average false positive rate f+, and average time tdec to obtain a true positive. The
results are shown for all 5 benchmarks and both detection mechanisms in Table 3.2.
“HT” and “KF” denote the local hypothesis testing and global Kalman Filter based
approaches respectively.
Local Hypothesis Testing (HT). HT was able to detect the active Trojans
(true positives) in all the benchmarks with 100% accuracy except for MC8051-T300.
MC8051-T300 had the smallest difference in power consumption between Trojan-
active and Trojan-inactive cases (see Table 3.1) and thus there was little deviation
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in the thermal profile. False positives on the inactive Trojans were only an issue in
the 4 sensor case and went to 0% with additional sensors. Increasing the number
of sensors also resulted in slower Trojan detection. Put simply, it took a longer
time for the majority of sensors to agree on a true positive when there were more
sensors. On average, 4 sensors could detect Trojans 70% faster than 32 (ignoring
MC8051-T300), but with higher false positive rate.
Global Kalman Filtering (KF). The KF was also very successful with true pos-
itives in every benchmark but one. Once again, the deviation in power/temperature
was too small to detect for MC8051-T300. The KF had a false positive rate of zero in
all instances but MC8051-T300. In contrast to HT, increasing the number of sensors
from 4 to 32 improved detection time by 38% on average (ignoring MC8051-T300).
Basically, the more measurements the better the resolution of thermal profile and
autocorrelation â. To illustrate, Figure 3.8 shows â of Trojan-inactive (blue) and
Trojan-active (red) ICs with 4 and 32 sensors for s38417-T300. The Trojan-inactive
autocorrelation stays below the threshold aT (black line) while the Trojan-active
autocorrelation diverges from zero and exceeds the threshold. The Trojan-active
case crosses the threshold more quickly in the 32 sensor case.
Note that the results in Table 3.2 correspond to the case where the ICs were in
stable thermal states, but we also ran trials at room temperature. For the latter, the
KF yielded similar results.
Comparing Local HT and Global KF. While both approaches worked well, the
KF achieved better results. The KF found active Trojans 60% faster on average



















































Figure 3.8: Average autocorrelation (â) over time with 4 and 32 sensors for s38417-T300
could only operate with the ICs in a stable thermal state, the KF worked in all
scenarios. The advantage of HT is its lower overheads.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed innovative temperature-based approaches for on-
line Trojan detection. The merits and key features of our approaches are summarized
as follows:
• Exploit Thermal Sensors For Low Sensing Overhead. Existing run-time ap-
proaches [32, 33] have suffered from high overheads and lack of scalability.
Our approach exploits the fact that Trojan activation can cause significant
changes in power consumption, which will be reflected in the IC’s thermal
profile. Our temperature-based Trojan detection has lower sensing overhead
compared to prior run-time approaches because many electronic systems are
already equipped with thermal sensors for dynamic thermal management.
• Comprehensive in Nature. Our novel temperature-based Trojan detection is
a basic instance of the comprehensive strategy discussed in Section 1.4. Each
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phase of the IC supply chain/process plays a critical role in our method. In
the design phase, we statistically characterize an IC’s power/thermal dynam-
ics to create “golden models” and place optimally thermal sensors based on
these statistics. At the test-time phase, we weed out Trojan-infected ICs with
prior detection approaches. We also gather information from ICs that pass
logic-based approaches and side-channel analysis in order to calibrate each IC
for fabrication variation. The run-time phase integrates the information from
the previous phases with thermal sensor measurements to detect Trojan acti-
vation. Any Trojans that are detected at run-time can be reported to warn
other IC consumers as well as to improve future design instances and test-time
verification approaches.
• Strong Theoretical Foundations. Existing methods for Trojan detection tend
to be ad-hoc in nature. They fail to make optimal decisions regarding Tro-
jan presence and do not directly account for measurement/process noise. In
contrast, the temperature-based detection schemes that we propose are more
rigorous and rely on fundamental theories from signal estimation and detection
theory. Specifically, we use well-known Kalman Filter (KF) theory to com-
bines prior knowledge of state transitions and statistical noise characteristics
with sensor measurements in order to optimally estimate IC thermal profiles
in time. We also exploit Bayesian decision theory and autocorrelation metrics
to create optimal thresholds in our detection schemes.
• Highly Generalizable. Our approaches are highly generalizable in various re-
78
spects. First, the thermal sensing circuits (eg. ring oscillators) are easy to
manufacture on processor, ASIC, and FPGA platforms. Second, the KF ap-
proach itself can be extended to utilize multiple and heterogeneous sensing
modalities for better IC temperature or state tracking. Our proposed frame-
work can also be extended to utilize nonlinear and non-Gaussian filtering
approaches such as the Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) and Particle Filter
(PF). Finally, while we have only applied our approach to hardware Trojans,
it should also be able to handle software Trojan attacks which may have a
similar impact on power/temperature profiles.
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Chapter 4
Mask Generation for Physically Unclonable Functions
4.1 Introduction
As discussed in Chapter 2, silicon PUFs rely on the existence of variations
occurring during IC fabrication to produce unique, unclonable, and tamper-resistant
signatures. At a relatively small overhead, the PUF signatures can be used to
deal with many hardware-related attacks, such as overbuilding, counterfeiting, and
microprobing. While improving PUF quality has been an important area of research,
we have recognized two significant shortcomings in prior work:
• Limited Focus on Fabrication. Figure 4.1 summarizes the techniques used to
improve PUF quality and is organized according to each technique’s goal and
with respect to its place in the IC design/fabrication process. One can see
that existing work (with lone exception in [92]) has only attempted to im-
prove PUF sensitivity to systematic variations (SV), random variations (RV),
and environmental variations (EV) at architectural level, at circuit level, and
with additional post-fabrication processing. While such techniques success-
fully exploit the existence of variations, they do not explicitly focus on the
fabrication process itself, which is the source of PUF quality in the first place.
Rather, they treat the manufacturing process and underlying variations as a
black box.
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SV Compensation RV Enhancement Resistance to EV




Post-Fabrication [72, 50] [65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71]
Figure 4.1: Summary of existing research geared towards improving PUF quality. Columns
represent the three main areas of research: Systematic Variation (SV) Compensation, Random
Variation (RV) Enhancement, and Environmental Variation (EV) Resistance. Rows represent the
steps in the IC design/fabrication process. Starred rows denote steps where research is lacking.
New approaches at mask and layout levels are the focus of Chapters 4 and 5 in this dissertation.
• Current DFM Flow Counterintuitive for PUFs. With each generation of VLSI
technology, the miniaturization and complexity of state-of-the-art products is
making it more challenging to achieve high-yielding designs. In short, modern
feature sizes make the fabrication process and resulting ICs more susceptible
to process variations. In response, there has been an initiative called Design-
for-Manufacturability (DFM) in the fabrication community. DFM research
models the sources of fabrication variations and develops tools for suppress-
ing all of them. While DFM has been critical to continuous scaling of ICs,
PUFs designed and manufactured by such approaches will be more immune
to random variations and, therefore, shall generate signatures of lower qual-
ity. Furthermore, since the existing techniques for enhancing PUFs (shown
in Figure 4.1) do not address the fabrication process or DFM directly, they
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must incur larger overheads than necessary to counter DFM’s suppression of
random variations.
In this chapter and the next chapter of this dissertation, we propose innovative
techniques which overcome the above shortcomings. In an attempt to bridge the
gap between DFM and PUF research, we take a fundamentally different approach
that places greater emphasis on physical layout, mask generation, and the fabrication
process to improve PUF quality. Specifically, in Chapter 4, we propose two new mask
generation techniques that improve fabrication variation caused in PUFs during IC
patterning/lithography. In Chapter 5, we propose new standard cell layouts that
reduce the impact of systematic variation on PUFs and show how they can be
combined with existing circuit design approaches.
The key features of our approaches and main contributions are summarized as
follows:
• Role-reversal for DFM. Our approaches exploit the existing DFM models and
tools that are ignored in current PUF research. We also develop new algo-
rithms that reverse the role of standard DFM tools and extend them towards
improving PUF quality. Rather than trying to suppress all fabrication varia-
tions, our techniques are designed to increase sensitivity to random variations
and thereby improve the uniqueness, unpredictability, and reliability of PUF
signatures. Furthermore, we also develop techniques that focus on suppress-
ing only systematic variations within PUFs. All this is done such that the
non-PUF circuits remain unaffected (more below).
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• Effectively Balance DFM and PUF Quality. Although PUFs rely heavily on
random variations, non-PUF portions of an IC (CPU, etc.) desire less vari-
ability during fabrication. Our approaches can balance these competing needs.
For mask generation, we need only apply our techniques to PUF portions of
the IC. The mask for remaining parts of the IC can still be obtained using
standard DFM approaches. Since spatial correlations imposed by mask gen-
eration algorithms decay very quickly with distance [93], we can easily avoid
any interference between the two mask patterns. In the case of standard cells,
the cells we develop for PUFs need only be used in PUF portions of the IC.
• Complimentary to Existing PUF Research. As shown in Figure 4.1, phys-
ical layout and mask generation occur in between circuit design and post-
fabrication steps of the standard design/fabrication flow. Since our approaches
occur after design, they can be applied to any PUF architecture/circuit design
(delay-based, memory-based, etc.) to generate better PUF signatures. Since
they enhance PUF quality during fabrication, they can also be complimented
by post-fabrication approaches if necessary. For example, the underlying PUF
circuits can also utilize existing error correction schemes to obtain further
improvements.
• Lower Overhead. Since our approaches are fabrication-based, they shall gen-
erally improve PUF quality with little architectural or circuit overheads (area,
power, etc.). Furthermore, by improving PUF quality, they can also reduce
the need for the architectural and circuit blocks required to overcome DFM.
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• Highly Generalizable. The models, objective functions, framework, and anal-
ysis used by our approaches are very general and can be used as a guide in
future mask generation, physical layout, and IC fabrications techniques for
improving PUF quality.
For the remainder of this chapter, we examine the variations occurring during
optical lithography and develop new mask generation techniques to improve PUF
quality at fabrication. In Chapter 5, we look at a layout-based approach to improve
PUF quality.
Outline. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows.
• As discussed in Chapter 2, variations during manufacturing heavily influence
PUF quality. In this chapter, we look at the lithography/patterning step of
manufacturing to improve variations in PUFs. Our main goal is to generate
lithography masks that result in better PUF signatures. In Section 4.2, we dis-
cuss background for optical lithography, Optical Proximity Correction (OPC,
often used to suppress fabrication variations, and state-of-the-art OPC-based
mask generation.
• In order to understand the impact of variations, we must have effective models
for fabrication variation. Section 4.3 discusses variability models from the lit-
erature. We also qualitatively illustrates the impact of systematic and random
variations on the RO-PUF.
• In Section 4.4, we discuss alternative OPC formulations and cost functions
called P-OPC and SVC-OPC that generate mask which improve PUF suscep-
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tibility to random and systematic variations respectively. We also highlight
how our approaches can be applied without affecting non-PUF portions of the
ICs.
• In Section 4.5, we discuss our experimental setup and results. We compare
the PUF quality resulting from conventional OPC and our proposed OPC
approaches for several different PUF architectures.
• The advantages of our mask-based approaches are summarized in the final
section of the chapter.
4.2 Preliminary
Notation. We denote matrices by bold letters and use subscripts and super-
scripts to denote matrix elements. For example, an element at row j and column i
of a matrix A is given by Aij.
4.2.1 Optical Lithography
Optical lithography is the process by which a photoresist covering a silicon
wafer is exposed to optical wavelengths and then developed to form desired pat-
terns/structures on the wafer. An optical lithography system consists of two mod-
ules [94] (shown in Figure 4.2) which are described below:
1. Illumination Module. A mask that contains the desired silicon patterns is
illuminated by a light source through an illumination lens. The mask is typ-
ically binary, meaning it consists of only transparent and opaque structures
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Figure 4.2: Optical Lithography System
which allow light to reach and prevent light from reaching the photoresist
respectively.
2. Projection Module. Light diffracts as it passes through transparent parts of
the mask. A projection lens picks up a portion of this light and projects an
“image” (pattern) onto the photoresist. Depending on the type of photoresist,
it either hardens or remains soft in presence of light. The portions of the resist
that receive enough light are removed by a chemical etching process. The parts
of the wafer still covered with resist are protected from doping, deposition, etc.
Lithography Models. The above lithography process and variations have been
modeled in the literature (eg. [48]) and there are many simulation tools that estimate
the structures in chips resulting from lithography (eg. Calibre Workbench). The
lithography process (illustrated in Figure 4.2) is modeled with two basic steps:
1. Light passing through the mask is projected onto the photoresist creating an
“aerial” image Ia. Let M
y
x ∈ {0, 1} denote the pixels at the location x, y for
the mask M where zero (one) refers to opaque (transparent) pixels. For a
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coherent imaging system, the aerial image is given by [95, 96]
Ia = |M ∗ h|2 (4.1)
where ∗ denotes the convolution operator. h denotes the point spread function












where J1 is the Bessel function of the first kind, order one [95], NA is the
numerical aperture of the projection lens, and λ is the source light wavelength.
2. Once the optical image falls onto the resist-coated wafer, the photoresist is
developed and etched based on image intensity at the corresponding wafer
location. If the photoresist material is positive (negative) and the image in-
tensity at a certain location is greater (lesser) than a specific threshold, the
resist gets etched out. The resulting image is called the resist or pattern image








where Ith is a constant intensity threshold.
Lithography Process Variations. Fundamentally, the optical light pattern
falling on the wafer decides what physical structures are fabricated. There are many
sources of variation in the optical lithography process which include imperfections
in the mask, light source, and lenses as well as variation in the distance between the
projection lens and wafer. These sources of variation result in differences between
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the pattern appearing on the photoresist and the desired pattern, which in turn
result in variation in structures and features as well as performance deviation from
design specifications.
Process variations during lithography are typically modeled as a combination
of focal and dose variations [48]:
1. Focal Variations (Defocus): Focal errors (defocus) are essentially small changes
in the distance between the light source and resist/wafer from the ideal setting.
Focus variations are modeled as a change to the PSF of the projection lens [96]






In Eqn. (4.4), F−1 denotes the inverse Fourier transform, h̃ = F (h), fx and
fy are spatial frequencies, and F denotes the defocus. Equation (4.4) is used in
place of hyx in Eqn. (4.1) to produce an aerial image Ia(F ) for a given defocus
F at the wafer plane. This impacts the pattern image I and therefore the
final manufactured transistor/wire parameters. Defocus has both random and
systematic components, with the systematic components generally regarded
as having six times the standard deviation of the random ones [48].
2. Exposure Dose Variations: Exposure dose variations result from differences in
light source intensity, exposure duration, etc. Dose variations are often mod-
eled by replacing the constant Ith in Eqn. (4.3) with a random variable [94].
Models for the systematic and random variation of defocus, dose, etc. are
discussed in Section 4.3.1.
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4.2.2 Optical Proximity Correction (OPC)
As IC features scale downward, it is more difficult to print high resolution pat-
terns on the wafer [94]. This is because the source light wavelengths are much larger
than modern feature sizes which increases their susceptibility to process variations.
Thus, there has been a great deal of work devoted towards developing techniques
that make the fabrication process more robust. For example, Optical Proximity
Correction (OPC) [94, 96] is a widely used technique that modifies the lithography
mask in order to improve the chance of obtaining desired patterns on the wafer.
There have been two types OPC algorithms discussed in the literature:
1. Polygon-based OPC treats the transparent parts of the mask as a set of poly-
gons. Then the polygons are broken down into edge segments which are iter-
atively moved with the goal of improving a cost function [93].
2. Pixel-based OPC represents each pixel of the mask as a 0 or 1 decision and
models the printed pattern as a continuous function [95]. Then an optimization
problem is solved by using a gradient descent-like algorithm. These algorithms
are also referred to as inverse lithography (ILT).
Basic OPC Algorithm Instance. Before moving on, we briefly discuss a basic
OPC algorithm and cost function which we feel summarize state-of-the-art OPC.
The algorithm follows a polygon-based approach, but also includes some pixel-based



























Figure 4.3: Basic OPC Algorithm
work1. In a nutshell, the basic algorithm [93] iteratively moves “mask edges” to
improve an optimization cost function (see below) until a stopping criterion is met.
The main steps are shown in Figure 4.3 and described as follows [93, 97]:
1. Inputs: An initial mask pattern is used as input.
2. Fragmentation: Polygons within the initial mask are fragmented into edges
(see Figure 4.4(a-b)). These fragmented edges are essentially optimization
variables. When shorter edges are used, there are more degrees of freedom
during the OPC algorithm [93]. The current mask M is set to the initial
mask.
3. Mask Perturbation: One or more edges in current mask M are chosen for
perturbation (i.e. offset from their current position). For example, a vertical
edge can be perturbed by moving one grid unit to the left or right from the
current position. Similarly, a horizontal edge can be perturbed by moving it
1Note that we illustrate our approaches using this basic framework, but the main concepts
should easily extend to other frameworks as well.
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up or down by one grid unit. Edges can be chosen for perturbation in a fixed
or random order. Two perturbed masks are shown in Figure 4.4(c-d).
4. Lithography Simulation: Perturbed masks result in different features in the
resist/wafer. Patterns resulting from the perturbed masks are simulated by a
calibrated lithography tool.
5. Parameter Extraction: The patterns themselves or characteristics of the pat-
terns (eg. channel length, active regions, etc.) are examined. IC performance
may also be computed from these patterns [97].
6. OPC controller: An objective cost is computed based on the extracted patterns
and/or performance. A perturbed mask is accepted if it improves the cost.
7. Iterate: If the algorithm’s stopping criteria has not been met, the algorithm
returns to step 3 and continues. Otherwise, the current mask is output as the
solution.
Conventional OPC (C-OPC) Objective. As discussed above, the typical goal
of OPC is a mask that obtains desired patterns on the wafer with high probability.
Most OPC objective functions will therefore use some difference between desired and
estimated patterns/parameters in the algorithm’s cost function. Several difference
metrics have been used in the literature including Edge Placement Error (EPE) [94]
and pixel-based Mean Square Error (MSE) [96].
As an example, we illustrate an objective cost function for state-of-the-art OPC
approaches. By state-of-the-art, we refer to OPC that accounts for the variations
in lithography. While in general not every OPC cost function models variations,
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approaches which do have been shown to produce more accurate IC features (eg. [94,
96]). For ease of exposition, we discuss an MSE-based cost function. MSE between





(Îyx − Iyx(M;F ))2 (4.5)
where x and y denote the horizontal and vertical coordinates of the pattern; M is
a matrix denoting the lithography mask (each element in M ∈ {0, 1} with 0 and 1
representing opaque and transparent pixels respectively); Îyx represents the desired
pattern at location x,y; Iyx(M;F ) denotes the estimated pattern at location x,y as
a function of mask M and defocus F . Note that MSE(M;F ) is a random variable
since it depends upon defocus F which is random. A mask that generates an IC
close to the target design can be determined by minimizing the expected MSE [96]
M∗ = argmin (µMSE) (4.6)
µMSE =
∫
MSE(M;F )p(F )dF (4.7)
where µMSE is the expected MSE and p(F ) represents the probability distribution
function of defocus. For this C-OPC objective, the basic OPC algorithm modifies
the mask patterns on each iteration so that the resulting IC patterns more closely
resemble the desired patterns across process variations. This cost function would
typically be applied to all portions of an IC (including PUFs) and reduce all variation
(systematic and random) in the printed patterns.
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(a) (b) (c) (d)
Figure 4.4: (a) Mask: White (gray) areas correspond to transparent (opaque) pixels; (b)
Fragmentation; (c) Mask perturbation 1; (d) Mask perturbation 2
4.3 Contributions and Discussion
In this dissertation, we focus on a delay-based PUF called the Ring Oscillator
PUF (RO-PUF) which was discussed earlier in Section 2.2.1.2. Note that this is
merely for the sake of illustration. The models, analysis, and algorithms proposed
in this dissertation are general and may be applied to other PUF instances as well.
4.3.1 Wafer Variability Model
PUF quality critically depends on the systematic and random variation present
in the PUFs. In this section, we discuss a wafer variability model which frames our
discussion on variation in chips and PUFs in future sections. In general, wafer
variation consists of the following components: (i) wafer-to-wafer; (ii) across wafer;
(iii) field-to-field; (iv) across field; and (v) device-to-device. In this chapter, we
adopt the hierarchical model discussed in [98] to analyze and model variation across
the wafer. In this model, any parameter p can be modeled as:
p = p0 + psys + pran (4.8)
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where
psys = paw + paf (4.9)
pran = pw2w + pf2f + pd2d (4.10)
p0 is the nominal parameter value and p is the actual value which includes systematic
and random deviations (psys and pran respectively) from the nominal value. psys
includes an across wafer component (paw) and an across field component (paf). pran
includes a wafer-to-wafer component (pw2w), a field-to-field component (pf2f), and a
device-to-device component (pd2d). pw2w, pf2f, and pd2d are assumed to be zero mean
Gaussian random variables. The systematic components paw and paf are modeled as
2D parabolic functions [98]:
paw(xw, yw) = awx
2
w + bwxw + cwy
2
w + dwyw + ewxwyw + fw (4.11)
paf(xf , yf ) = afx
2
f + bfxf + cfy
2
f + dfyf + efxfyf + ff (4.12)
where xw and yw denote horizontal and vertical locations on the wafer, xf and yf
denote horizontal and vertical locations in a field, and the remaining terms (aw,
bw, etc.) are modeling coefficients. The modeling coefficients for the systematic
variation and standard deviations for the random variations can be determined by
sampling from wafers as discussed in [98].
The above model is very general and has been used to characterize device
channel length, leakage power, and delay. In this chapter, we shall use it to char-
acterize RO oscillation frequency and the defocus experienced by chips/PUFs in a
wafer (as well as their corresponding probability distribution functions). For ex-































f represent the field location in wafer coordinates)
models (Eqns. (4.11) and (4.12)) with coefficients from [98]2. By including the
random components (pw2w, pf2f, and pd2d), one could obtain the defocus distribution
for any given chip. In this dissertation, we shall assume that the PDFs associated
with defocus are known.
4.3.2 Impact of Variations on PUFs
Below, we discuss how the variations in the lithography step affect the behavior
in wafers and PUFs. Note that this discussion is given in the context of RO-PUFs
merely for the sake of illustration. In general, effects of variation on other PUFs
can be modeled similarly.
Assume we have a wafer with n chips, each containing an RO-PUF with m
2Note that [98] contains modeling coefficients for effective channel length distributions (cal-
culated from RO frequencies). In this dissertation, we assume that RO frequency variations are
caused only by defocus errors and ignore dose variations for simplicity. We obtain defocus distri-
butions by scaling the distributions from [98] to a suitable defocus range (determined from [99]).
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ROs. We denote the jth ring oscillator on chip i as ROij and its oscillation frequency
by







where f0 is the nominal frequency (intended by design), f
i
sys,j is the systematic com-
ponent of the oscillation frequency, f iran,j is the random component of the oscillation
frequency, and f ienv,j denotes the noise due to environmental variations. f
i
ran,j is a
random variable that differs for every RO on all the wafers. f iran,j comes from lithog-
raphy as well as semiconductor doping (RDF) and etching (LER). f isys,j is mainly
from the lithography step and can be modeled as a function of the mask, defocus,
and exposure dose. In this dissertation, we assume that the systematic components
are constants for all wafers (wafer-to-wafer variation is purely random).
For chip i’s RO-PUF, the PUF response bit rig,h can be determined by the





∆f ig,h = f
i
g − f ih




env,g)− (f isys,h + f iran,h + f ienv,h)
= (f isys,g − f isys,h) + (f iran,g − f iran,h) + (f ienv,g − f ienv,h)







1 if ∆f ig,h < 0
0 otherwise
(4.15)
In most applications, nominal PUF responses are recorded in an enrollment/provisioning
step (see Section 2.2.2) where ∆f ienv,g,h = 0. After deployment, the responses are
re-generated (subject to noise) for authentication or cryptography. There are several
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major points about PUF responses that can be drawn from Eqns. (4.13)-(4.15):
• During provisioning, a PUF’s nominal response is determined by the random
and systematic components only. In instances where |∆f isys,g,h| >> |∆f iran,g,h|,
response rig,h will be heavily biased towards one bit value for all the wafers
because ∆f isys,g,h is a similar for all wafers (wafer-to-wafer variation is purely
random). As a result, the PUF responses shall possess lower uniqueness and
lower unpredictability. One should be able to improve this by decreasing
|∆f isys,g,h|, increasing |∆f iran,g,h|, or both.
• After deployment, responses may not re-generate exactly due to noise. For
|∆f isys,g,h + ∆f iran,g,h| < |∆f ienv,g,h|, the response will differ from the provi-
sioned response when the sign of ∆f ig,h changes. To improve the reliability,
one could increase ∆f isys,g,h, increase ∆f
i
ran,g,h, or both. However since sys-
tematic variations reduce uniqueness, increasing random variations would be
the best approach. One could also try to decrease ∆f ienv,g,h such as in the
approaches from Section 2.2.5.2).
4.4 Optical Proximity Correction for PUFs
In this section we propose two new OPC cost functions and corresponding
approaches for improving PUF quality. We begin by discussing our assumptions.
Then we describe the proposed algorithms and their objective cost functions (ran-
dom variation enhancement and systematic variation suppression respectively).
Assumptions. As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the wafer patterns resulting from
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lithography depend on the mask patterns, defocus, and dose in optical lithography.
In this chapter, we shall assume that the dose variations are zero3. In that case,
the underlying circuits (in our case ROs) depend strictly on the mask patterns and
defocus. We shall assume that the defocus in the wafer follows the model given by
Eqn. (4.8) and the corresponding probability distribution is known. We shall ignore
lot-to-lot variations for simplicity.
4.4.1 PUF-aware OPC (P-OPC)
Our first algorithm is called PUF-aware OPC (P-OPC) and it tries to do the
opposite of conventional OPC in PUF portions of the IC. Rather than suppress
random variations in the PUF patterns, P-OPC tries to enhance them in order to
obtain larger random variation in PUF parameters. Note that the remaining (non-
PUF) portions of the IC can still use the conventional approach provided that there
is a small “keep out” zone around the PUF that does not contain any non-PUF
portions of the IC (see Section 4.4.1.3 for details).
4.4.1.1 P-OPC Objective Cost
To illustrate P-OPC, we discuss an objective cost for RO-PUFs. As discussed
in Section 2.2, randomness in the RO frequency improves PUF quality. Our objective
function leverages this fact and finds an optimal mask pattern M∗ that increases
3This assumption is merely made for simplicity and ease of exposition. Our approaches can









σf represents the variance in RO frequency for a given mask and defocus distribu-
tion. µMSE denotes the average MSE between the intended and printed patterns.
Note that σf and µMSE can be computed using lithography simulations and distri-
butions for the defocus (details forthcoming). Our objective function balances two
competing goals: (i) we increase randomness in the RO frequency by maximizing
the variance in RO frequency (σf ) across the chips in the numerator; (ii) since in-
creasing frequency variation in the ROs may result in patterns that do not resemble
the size and structure of the intended design and may not function correctly, we also
include a corrective term in the denominator. The corrective term (µMSE) captures
the fact that we also want to keep the printed RO patterns similar to the desired
patterns on average.
4.4.1.2 P-OPC Optimization Algorithm
In this chapter, we use an instance of the basic OPC algorithm shown in
Figure 4.3 to solve our optimization problem. For brevity, we only highlight the
salient features of the P-OPC version:
• Inputs: An initial RO mask pattern is used as input. A discrete probability
distribution p(F ) for the defocus F for the chips in the wafer is also needed.
This could be generated from the model discussed in Section 4.3.1. It can be
assumed that an initial cost value is computed for the initial mask.
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• Mask Perturbation: In each iteration, we perturb every edge of the current
mask twice (i.e. move each vertical edge left and right, each horizontal edge
up and down). This results in a set of perturbed masks which differ from the
current mask by one (different) perturbed edge.
• Lithography Simulation: For each perturbed mask, we compute the RO polysil-
icon patterns I(M, F ) by a simulation model that employs Eqns. (4.1)-(4.4)
for different random values of defocus F (drawn from defocus distribution
p(F )).
• Parameter Extraction: The polysilicon patterns from the above simulations
represent physical parameters for the transistors in the ROs (channel length,
active region, etc.) which influence the RO frequencies. From the polysili-
con layers (which are non-rectangular), we extract effective channel lengths
for the transistors in the ROs [100]. A distribution for each RO’s oscillation
frequency is computed using standard models [101] with the effective chan-
nel lengths (from the polysilicon patterns generated by p(F )) and nominal
electrical parameters (threshold voltage, oxide thickness, etc.).
• OPC controller: The OPC controller computes µMSE and σf as follows:
µMSE = εF{MSE(M, F )} ≈
∑
∀F
MSE(M, F )p(F ) (4.17)
σf =
√
εF {f(M, F )2} − εF{f(M, F )}2 (4.18)
where MSE(M, F ) denotes the mean square error between the intended and
printed patterns (Î and I(M, F )) for mask M and defocus F ; p(F ) represents
the discrete probability distribution function of defocus; f(M, F ) is the ex-
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IC Keep out
Figure 4.6: Keep Out Zone Illustration: Non-PUF region, PUF region, and keep out zone are
shown in white, dark gray, and light gray respectively. δ denotes the length of the keep out zone.
Note the figure is not drawn to scale.
tracted frequency for mask M and defocus F . The cost of each perturbed
mask is computed as σf/µMSE. Note that if a perturbed mask results in a
pattern that does not produce functional ROs, then its cost is set to zero and
hence it will not be selected as a solution. The controller chooses the perturbed
mask resulting in the greatest improvement to cost as the mask for the next
iteration.
• Stopping Criteria: (i) We put a limit on the total number of iterations; (ii)
If the cost cannot be improved by perturbing any edge before the limit is
reached, we terminate.
4.4.1.3 Ensuring Functional Correctness with P-OPC
Since P-OPC increases variation, there is a risk that portions of the IC and
the PUF may not function properly. Our approach can overcome reliability issues
in the IC and PUF as follows
• Non-PUF Regions: We use small “keep out zone” around the PUF which
ensures the patterns of light corresponding to the P-OPC algorithm and con-
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ventional OPC algorithm do not interfere. An illustration of the IC and PUF
with keep out zone is shown in Figure 4.6. The length of the keep out zone,
which we denote by δ, depends on parameters of the optical lithography sys-
tem. From [93], δ is proportional to λ/NA where λ is the wavelength of light
and NA is the numerical aperture of the optical system’s projection lens. For
90nm process technology, we estimate δ’s range as .25 to 1µm from [93].
• PUF region: In the parameter extraction step of the algorithm, we extract
polysilicon patterns and determine whether the perturbed mask can produce
a functional RO with high probability. If not, we guarantee that the perturbed
mask is not selected by the OPC controller. In some instances (modeling errors
etc.), the P-OPC mask may still result in some PUF failures. One way we
propose to overcome this is with self-correcting designs [102]. For example, by
fabricating x redundant ROs in the PUF and including some reconfigurable
hardware, we could detect failures with built-in self-test and correct up to x
failing ROs after fabrication.
4.4.1.4 Dealing with Systematic Variations
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, systematic variation is detrimental to PUF qual-
ity while random variation benefits PUF quality. Since the sources of variation in
lithography have both random and systematic components [48], the above method
will effectively amplify both which is undesired. Thus, the P-OPC approach should
ideally be applied when architectural or circuit compensation methods to the PUF
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layout/design which counteract systematic variation (eg. [46, 103]) are also applied.
This ensures that the variations being amplified are mostly random.
4.4.2 Systematic Variation Compensation OPC (SVC-OPC))
As discussed in Section 4.3.2, in instances where systematic variations are
large, the PUF responses can be biased resulting in lower uniqueness and lower
unpredictability. One way to improve this is to reduce the systematic variation
(and resulting correlation) in the PUFs generated from lithography. In this section,
we discuss an algorithm called Systematic Variation Compensation OPC (SVC-
OPC) to accomplish this. Once again, we discuss the algorithm in the context of an
RO-PUF, but the same basic framework should also extend to other PUF structures.
In the SVC-OPC approach, we relax the notion from conventional OPC that
the PUF patterns must closely match the design patterns across process variations.
Rather, we allow the PUF patterns to deviate from the nominal design patterns as
long as it lessens the impact that systematic variation will have on the PUFs. For
example, in the RO-PUF, one can allow each RO’s silicon patterns to deviate from
the nominal patterns as long as the patterns of each RO result in similar systematic
frequency components for all ROs in the chip. In that case, when PUF responses
are generated (subtracting oscillation frequency of any two ROs), the systematic
components will cancel (∆fsys = 0). Note that any reliability and keep out zone
related issues with SVC-OPC can be dealt with as previously discussed for P-OPC
(see Section 4.4.1.3).
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Notation. Let there be n chips on a wafer and let each chip contain an RO-
PUF with m ROs. We denote the jth ring oscillator on chip i as ROij and its
oscillation frequency by f ij . Let f
i
j be a function of the mask pattern Mj (i.e. the
mask pattern used to fabricate ROij ∀i) and the defocus experienced by ROij during
the lithography step. We assume that the defocus probability distribution functions
corresponding to each RO location in the wafers are known. Let pj(F ) denote the
defocus distribution (including both systematic and random variation components)
for the jth RO across the chips (1 ≤ j ≤ m).
General Objective Goal. Since defocus is similar between wafers (wafer-to-
wafer variation assumed to be random), the systematic component of RO oscilla-
tion frequency will also be similar for ROs at the same corresponding location on
different wafers. Thus, for any given chip, there will be similar (biased) challenge
response behavior and signatures (lowering PUF uniqueness) as discussed in Sec-
tion 4.3.2. In order to remove the systematic bias in any chip’s RO-PUF, all the ROs
in the RO-PUF should have the same systematic oscillation frequency component
(i.e. f isys,g(Mg) = f
i
sys,h(Mh) ∀g, h, i). This effectively means any difference in oscil-
lation frequency between ROs in a chip is purely determined by the random sources
(∆frand) because the systematic components cancel each other out (∆fsys = 0). As
a result, each PUF’s responses (signature) will be as unique and unpredictable as
possible. Mathematically, we may express this goal as
M∗(i) = argmin σf
(i), 1 ≤ i ≤ n (4.19)
σf
(i) represents the variance in the RO oscillation frequencies on chip i. M∗(i) =
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{M1,M2, . . . ,Mm} and represents the set of masks for chip i that minimize the vari-
ance σf
(i). Basically, we want to find mask patterns for all ROs in the RO-PUF such
that the systematic variation between all ROs within each chip i is small. In that
case, we ensure that each RO-PUF’s responses depend mostly on random frequency
components. The systematic variation within chips does not matter because the
systematic components of RO frequencies will (mostly) cancel when any ROs are
compared. This differs from conventional state-of-the-art approaches where the goal
is to minimize all variations without regarding the systematic differences between
RO frequencies.
4.4.2.1 SVC-OPC Objective Cost
One issue with the above goal (Eqn. (4.19)) is that there may not be one set of
masks that minimizes the systematic variation in oscillation frequency within every
chip on the wafer simultaneously (i.e. M∗(g) ̸= M∗(h), g ̸= h). However, only one
set of masks can be used for all the chips in the wafer. Thus, we use a more relaxed






In Eqn. (4.20), we find the optimal mask patterns that minimize the sum of RO
frequency variances σf
(i) across the chips. This objective captures the fact that
we want small variance in RO frequency within each chip. As discussed above, if
the systematic frequency difference between all ROs within each chip i is small,
each RO-PUF’s responses depend mostly on random frequency components (eg.
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semiconductor doping, threshold voltage, etc.). Thus, this should result in responses
that are less biased, more unique, and less predictable.
4.4.2.2 SVC-OPC Algorithm
The optimal solution to the SVC-OPC objective function is a set of masks
pattern (one mask for each RO in the RO-PUFs, i.e. Mj, 1 ≤ j ≤ m). However,
the P-OPC algorithm discussed earlier was only interested in one RO mask for all
the ROs in the chip. Thus, we had to modify the P-OPC algorithm with some
additional steps to accommodate SVC-OPC. Specifically, we cycle through each RO
mask pattern in the chip on every iteration of the algorithm. The SVC-OPC steps
are as follows:
1. Inputs: Initial mask patterns M0j and the discrete defocus PDFs pj(F ) (1 ≤
j ≤ m) are the algorithm inputs. It can be assumed that an initial cost value
is computed for the initial masks.
2. Fragmentation: Polygons within M0j are fragmented into edges for each j.
3. Current Mask Pattern Index: Let index a denote which mask that we shall
perturb and optimize in the current iteration of the algorithm. We begin by
optimizing the mask corresponding to the first RO M01 . Thus, we set the
current mask index to a = 1.
4. Mask Perturbation: Same as P-OPC.
5. Lithography Simulation: Same as P-OPC.
6. Performance Extraction: Same as P-OPC.
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7. OPC controller: Based on the frequency distributions generated in the above
















pj(F ) denotes the discrete defocus distribution for the jth RO across the
chips; k denotes the number of bins in each distribution; f(M, Fi) represents
the frequency at defocus sample Fi; εM is an average operation taken over all
the RO frequencies at sample Fi. Essentially, σ̂
(i)
f is the RO frequency variance
(includes all m ROs) at sample Fi from the PDFs. The perturbed mask with
the greatest improvement to cost is chosen as the ath RO’s new mask.
8. Iterate: We increment the mask index a and return to step 4. Thus, in the
next iteration, we perturb the mask for the next RO in the PUF and calculate
the new cost. Note that if a > m (we’ve cycled through all the RO patterns),
we set a = 1 (returning back to the first RO mask pattern). The algorithm
repeats steps 4-8 until the stopping criteria are met. We use the same stopping
criteria as P-OPC.
4.4.3 Qualitative Comparison of P-OPC and SVC-OPC
The P-OPC and SVC-OPC approaches, overheads, advantages, disadvantages,
etc. are summarized as follows:
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• Overall Approach. While both algorithms manipulate the lithography mask
to improve PUF quality, they do so with opposite goals in mind. P-OPC
tries to increase sensitivity to random fabrication variation. SVC-OPC tries
to minimize the impact of systematic variations on the PUFs.
• Area overheads. Both approaches require that the PUF regions of the IC be
surrounded by a keep out zone where no transistors are fabricated. The keep
out zone ensures that non-PUF portions on the IC remain unaffected by the
P-OPC and SVC-OPC objective functions. As discussed in Section 4.4.1.3,
the length of the keep out zone δ is dependent on the process technology and
is generally quite small when compared to the length of the entire IC. Thus,
the area overheads in both approaches are small.
• Algorithm Overheads. In the RO-PUF instance of the problem, P-OPC solves
its objective cost function and obtains one mask for all ROs. Since SVC-
OPC tries to eliminate correlation within all the chips on the wafer (a more
challenging objective), it obtains a new mask pattern for each RO. Thus, SVC-
OPC should have higher runtime overhead. Note that since both algorithms
only apply to the small PUF-region of a chip, the overheads should be small
relative to the overhead of standard OPC on the whole chip.
• Designer/Fab Collaboration. Since both approaches are manufacturer-based,
collaboration between the design house and the manufacturer is required. The
design house must explicitly reveal the PUF’s location to the manufacturer so
the manufacturer can apply the proposed algorithms at the PUF region. In
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case of large companies which own their own fabs (eg. Intel), collaboration
should be no problem whatsoever. In the case of smaller companies, we think
that manufacturers could offer this service at a premium to interested cus-
tomers.
In the next section, we shall simulate the proposed approaches and compare





We simulated fabrication of RO-PUFs using the models, masks, etc. described
below. The RO-PUF architecture is shown in Figure 2.5. Each RO consisted of 3
inverters and ROs were organized in an array on the chips.
Wafer Defocus. Our wafer contains 165 chips. We used the hierarchical model
discussed in Section 4.3.1 with coefficients and Gaussian parameters from [98] for
defocus. From this model, we also generated discrete probability distributions for
defocus which were used in the lithography simulations.
Optical Lithography Parameters. Our feature size (critical dimension) is 90nm.
The numerical aperture (NA) is 0.65 and the wavelength of the optical light is 193nm.
For simplicity, the illumination source is assumed to be coherent.
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Fabrication Simulation. We simulated fabrication of the 165 chips in the wafer.
We determined physical and electrical parameters of the ROs in the chips from two
sources in the manufacturing process: (i) polysilicon layers generated by the simula-
tions; (ii) random threshold voltages of the RO transistors. Polysilicon layers were
computed using the equations discussed in Section 4.2.1, masks generated by the
algorithms (see below) and defocus values for the wafer. The defocus values were
randomly chosen for each RO in the wafer according to the defocus distribution dis-
cussed above. We extracted effective channel lengths [100] for all transistors in the
ROs from the resulting polysilicon patterns. Threshold voltages for the transistors
in each RO and in each chip were randomly chosen from a Gaussian distribution
which varied ±12.5% around a mean threshold voltage. We assumed typical sup-
ply voltage, mobility, etc. for the remaining parameters and computed the RO
oscillation frequencies as in [101].
4.5.1.2 Mask Generation Algorithms
We generated four PUF populations each containing 165 chips. Masks were
generated by the following algorithms and used to simulate fabrication of the ROs
in each RO-PUF population:
• C-OPC:We generated one mask for all the ROs using the C-OPC cost function
and the basic OPC Algorithm discussed in Section 4.2.2. We used the RO
polysilicon pattern corresponding to the standard minimum design rules for
90nm devices as the algorithm’s initial mask pattern.
110
• P-OPC: We generated one mask for all the ROs using the P-OPC cost function
and algorithm discussed in Section 4.4.1. As the initial mask, we used the mask
generated by C-OPC.
• SVC-OPC: We generated a mask for every RO in the PUF using the SVC-
OPC algorithm discussed in Section 5.3.1. As the initial mask for all the ROs,
we used the mask generated by C-OPC.
For all the algorithms, we used discrete PDFs with k = 31 sampling points/bins.
4.5.1.3 PUF Evaluation
For each PUF, we extracted x response bits at nominal voltage supply in
a provisioning step. The x response bits were concatenated together to form an
x bit identifier/key for each PUF device. We evaluated the quality of each PUF
population’s signatures/keys as follows:
• Uniqueness was estimated using inter-distance (Eqn. (2.1)).
• Reliability was estimated assuming voltage supply variation using intra-distance
(Eqn. (2.2)). We randomly varied voltage supply for each inverter in each RO
and chip by ±1% and collected s = 100 sample responses.
• Unpredictability (randomness) was estimated by either min-entropy or the
NIST test suite [73]. Min-entropy is computed as








where S represents a PUF signature and Pr(S) denotes the probability of gen-
erating signature S. Since it is computationally expensive, we only calculated
min-entropy for small RO-PUFs (10 ROs per PUF). We used the NIST test
suite for large RO-PUFs (512 ROs per PUF). The NIST test suite takes as
input several bitstreams from the same source and determines if the streams
can be considered random. We evaluated our PUFs using the NIST test suite
in two ways. First, we used the signatures generated by each PUF as the
input bitstreams to NIST. We call this the within-chip approach since it de-
termines the predictability/randomness among the response bits within each
chip’s signature. Second, we grouped response bits of all the PUF signatures
according to their bit position in the signatures. For x-bit PUF signatures,
there are x groups. These x groups were used as the input bitstreams to NIST.
We call this the between-chip approach because it determines the predictabil-
ity/randomness of each response bit among the PUFs themselves. The NIST
tests we used were the following4: Frequency, Block Frequency, Cumulative
Sums (2 variants), Runs, Longest Run, Approximate Entropy, and Serial (2
variants).
4.5.1.4 ROs and RO-PUF Response Extraction
We used two architectures in our experiments: one with 10 ROs per PUF and
one with 512 ROs per PUF. We used three strategies for generating PUF response
4These are the only NIST tests appropriate for the size of our dataset.
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bits:
• Ranking: ROs are sorted based on oscillation frequency and the sorted order
acts as the response/signature [104]. In a PUF with m ROs, there are m!
possible ways to sort them which yields ⌈log2(m!)⌉ response bits.
• Decoupled Neighbor: We generated each response bit by comparing two ROs
in the PUF. We chose ROs to compare as follows [50]. The ROs were bro-
ken into pairs. Each RO was only used in one pair and the ROs in the pair
were neighbors in the RO-PUF array. Since nearby ROs experience similar
defocus, this setup is naturally resilient to effects of systematic variation. How-
ever, assuming m ROs in the PUF, only m/2 bits can be generated with this
approach.
• All Possible Pairs: In this approach, we compared every possible pair of ROs in
the PUF rather than just neighbors. Assumingm ROs in the PUF,m(m−1)/2
response bits can be generated.
Results for the PUF populations in these three scenarios are discussed below.
4.5.2 Results and Discussion
4.5.2.1 Ranking Approach
We use this approach since it is a strong indicator of how much entropy can
be extracted from the RO-PUFs. The RO-PUFs tested in this scenario contained
10 ROs per PUF and the signature/keys were 22 bits long. Table 4.1 shows the
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uniqueness, reliability, and min-entropy for each PUF population.
PUF Uniqueness (Inter-distance). We found that the mean uniqueness was
closest to the ideal 50% for SVC-OPC. We expected SVC-OPC to have high unique-
ness compared to the others since it minimizes systematic variation in the PUFs.
P-OPC and C-OPC obtained approximately the same uniqueness.
PUF Reliability (Intra-distance). Table 4.1 shows that the P-OPC approach
has mean intra-distance closest to the ideal 0% followed by SVC-OPC. As a result of
increasing all variation, PUFs generated by P-OPC are more easily distinguishable
and therefore more reliable as the voltage supply varies. C-OPC had the lowest
reliability since it essentially minimizes all variation in the ROs.
PUF Unpredictabilty (Min-entropy). The upper bound for min-entropy in
this setup is − log2(10!) = 21.7911. The closest to the upper bound was SVC-OPC
with 19.66. This is not surprising because SVC-OPC reduces the systematic vari-
ation between the ROs and should make the PUF signatures less biased. P-OPC
obtained the second highest min-entropy followed by C-OPC which obtained the
lowest. Overall, SVC-OPC and P-OPC masks resulted in 33% and 5.75% improve-
ments respectively over the conventional approach.
4.5.2.2 Decoupled Neighbor Approach
In this approach, systematic variation in the PUFs is reduced by choosing ROs
with similar systematic offset. The systematic variations are naturally less since the




µ 49.5% 49.5% 49.8%
σ 10.8% 10.7% 10.6%
Reliability
µ 14.9% 8.84% 12.1%
σ 8.26% 7.62% 8.07%
Unpredictability H∞ 14.78 15.63 19.66
Table 4.1: Mean (µ) inter-distance and intra-distance, standard deviation (σ) of inter-distance
and intra-distance, and Min-entropy (H∞) for ranking case
tested in this scenario contained 512 ROs per PUF. The signature/keys in this case
were 256 bits long. Table 4.2 shows the uniqueness, reliability, and unpredictability
for this scenario.
PUF Uniqueness (Inter-distance). Table 4.2 indicates that the PUFs generated
by each approach have very similar means and standard deviations for inter-distance.
This is not surprising since the decoupled neighbor approach reduces systematic
variation in the PUFs.
PUF Reliability (Intra-distance). The results show that the P-OPC approach
has the best reliability. Since the P-OPC approach increases random variation
between RO frequencies, response bits (which are generated by comparing two ROs)
are less likely to flip due to voltage supply noise. The C-OPC and SVC-OPC
approaches are more susceptible to noise because they do not increase variation
between ROs in the chips. Since C-OPC explicitly reduces all variation, it has the
lowest reliability.




µ 50.0% 50.0% 50.0%
σ 3.10% 3.13% 3.15%
Reliability
µ 15.8% 9.52% 12.2%
σ 3.88% 4.93% 4.84%
NIST
within-chip 9/9 9/9 9/9
between-chip 9/9 9/9 9/9
Table 4.2: Mean (µ) inter-distance and intra-distance, standard deviation (σ) of inter-distance
and intra-distance, and NIST pass rates for decoupled neighbor case
between-chip NIST tests were passed in each mask generation approach. We found
all the approaches did quite well since the decoupled neighbor approach reduces
systematic variation in the PUF architecture. The C-OPC, SVC-OPC, and P-OPC
approaches passed all the tests which indicates that their signatures are random.
4.5.2.3 All Pairs Approach
This approach should be more susceptible to systematic variation since ROs
fabricated with very different defocus values are used to generate responses. How-
ever, it can generate longer PUF signatures compared to the decoupled neighbor
approach. The RO-PUFs tested in this scenario contained 512 ROs per PUF. The
signature/keys were as large as 130816 bits long. Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the
uniqueness, reliability, and unpredictability for this scenario.
PUF Uniqueness (Inter-distance). Table 4.3 shows that the SVC-OPC ap-
proach obtained average uniqueness closest to the ideal 50% and with lowest stan-
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dard deviation. C-OPC obtained the worst average uniqueness compared to the
other approaches but lower standard deviation that P-OPC.
PUF Reliability (Intra-distance). Table 4.3 also shows the reliability. The
results were similar to the previous two cases and will not be discussed for brevity.
PUF Unpredictabilty (NIST tests). Using every RO pair possible (130816)
results in correlation in the bitstreams input to NIST because the response bits are
not independently generated. Thus, none of the approaches passed the NIST tests
in this scenario. In order to compare the approaches and still potentially pass the
NIST tests, we generated new keys as follows:
• We use the 256 challenges from the decoupled neighbor case as input to the
PUF and generate the first 256 bits of every PUF’s key.
• To generate a key of x total bits, we arbitrarily choose (x − 256) additional
challenges. Each arbitrary challenge utilizes a new RO pair (i.e. different from
the original 256) and generates another response bit.
• The same 256 challenges and (x− 256) arbitrary challenges are used as input
to all the PUFs in each population to generate their keys.
In practice, we generated arbitrary challenges by randomly choosing new RO pairs.
We did this 100 times and ended up with 100 “sample keys”. We also repeated the
process for several different values of x and obtained keys that were 320, 384, 448,
and 512 bits long. We ran the NIST tests for each of the 100 samples and values of
x. We recorded the percentage of cases that passed all the NIST tests in Table 4.4.




µ 47.3% 48.5% 50.0%
σ 3.61% 6.49% 3.19%
Reliability
µ 15.0% 8.71% 11.6%
σ 3.73% 4.81% 4.29%
Table 4.3: Mean and standard deviation of inter-distance and intra-distance for all pairs case
key size (bits)
320 384 448 512
C-OPC 0% 0% 0% 0%
P-OPC 0% 0% 0% 0%
SVC-OPC 46% 32% 16% 14%







Table 4.5: Mask Generation Overhead
256 bits that still pass NIST tests. Furthermore, as one would expect, the longer the
key the less often the NIST tests were passed. The results support our prior results
for the ranking approach which indicated that the keys generated by the SVC-OPC
approach have larger min-entropy.
4.5.2.4 Mask Generation Algorithm Overheads
We also recorded the time required by the mask generation algorithms in
Table 4.5. Note that since the P-OPC and SVC-OPC algorithms used the C-OPC
mask as initial input, we have included the initialization (C-OPC) in their overall
runtime. Thus, both cases have larger overhead than C-OPC. Comparing SVC-OPC
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and P-OPC overheads, SVC-OPC required much more time because it generates a
mask for every RO in the PUF. In any case, since masks only need to be generated
once for the PUF region and can be used to fabricate PUFs in countless chips, these
overheads should be acceptable.
4.5.3 Summary of Results
The results in this section can be summarized as follows:
• The proposed approaches (SVC-OPC and P-OPC) outperform the conven-
tional approach (C-OPC) in at least one of the PUF quality metrics (unique-
ness, reliability, unpredictability) and yield comparable results in others.
• The SVC-OPC approach generates PUFs that have excellent uniqueness and
unpredictability. The uniqueness/unpredictability are high in all our test sce-
narios because the SVC-OPC masks reduce systematic variation. Results also
showed that only SVC-OPC could generate longer keys that pass the NIST
tests. While the reliability was lower than P-OPC, it still better than the con-
ventional approach (21% improvement). We also feel that this could always
be improved by using SVC-OPC on variation resistant circuit designs [63, 64]
and shall investigate this in future work.
• The P-OPC approach generates PUFs with higher variation between ROs.
The uniqueness/unpredictability end up lower than SVC-OPC since P-OPC
doesn’t suppress the systematic variation. However, the larger overall variation
results in higher reliability than SVC-OPC and C-OPC (40% improvement
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over C-OPC).
• The SVC-OPC and P-OPC mask generation algorithms have the larger run-
time overheads than C-OPC. However, since masks only need to be generated
once for the PUF region and can be used to fabricate countless chips, the
overhead should be acceptable for practical applications.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we presented a novel framework for improving PUFs which
focused on mask generation for lithography. The merits of the approaches from this
chapter are as follows:
• PUF Quality Improvements at Mask Generation Step: Our approaches are
the first to exploit existing DFM models and tools that are ignored in current
PUF research. Specifically, we used the hierarchical variability model [98] to
express random and systematic variations in wafers. Then, we re-investigated
OPC with new PUF-based cost functions to make improvements in PUF qual-
ity: one that enhanced random variations and one that suppressed systematic
variations. Since both approaches occur after design, they can be applied
to any PUF architecture/circuit design (delay-based, memory-based, etc.) to
generate better PUF signatures.
• Lower Overhead: Our approaches do not have the same hardware overheads
as architectural/circuit based approaches. The main overheads occur during
mask generation and, since the portion of the mask for the PUF is small
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compared to the rest of the IC design, these overheads are small. Our two
approaches also require a keep-out zone around the PUF. However, the length
of the zone is on the order of .25 to 1µm for 90nm process technology, which
is an insignificant cost to chip area.
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Chapter 5
Custom Cell Layouts for Physically Unclonable Functions
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter, we demonstrated how Optical Proximity Correction
(OPC) could be used to manipulate systematic and random variations for better
PUF quality. Being that OPC applies to the lithography mask, it is best suited for
fabrication companies rather than fab-less IC design houses (who cannot control the
mask). Our objective in this chapter is to investigate DFM techniques applied at
the physical layout level, which is the last portion of the design in the hands of the
designer.
Fundamentally, the physical layout affects the wafer topography, CMP, optical
proximity effects, etc.; all of which contribute to PUF variability. Thus, by altering
the layout, one should be able to manipulate manufacturing variations and once
again improve the uniqueness, reliability, and unpredictability of PUF signatures.
In this chapter, we take advantage of a technique called self-compensation [103] and
use it to create customized standard cell layouts for PUFs that are less sensitive
to systematic variations. We also combine our custom cell layouts with random
variation enhancing PUF circuit designs. This combined procedure effectively al-
lows the designer to simultaneously increase sensitivity to random variations while
suppressing systematic variations for better PUF quality.
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Outline. Background on the self-compensation technique is discussed in Sec-
tion 5.2.1. Section 5.2.2 discusses the impact of variations on delay of PUFs. Our
self-compensation-based optimization procedure for creating custom cell layouts for
PUFs is described in Section 5.3.1. Two random variation enhancing circuit designs
are discussed in Section 5.3.2. Experimental setup and results are discussed in Sec-




As discussed in the previous chapter, defocus is one of the main sources of
variation in the patterning/lithography step of IC fabrication. The impact of defocus
depends heavily on the density of features/patterns in the IC’s physical layout [48].
Features that are further apart (isolated or iso) result in shorter channel lengths
while dense features obtain longer channel lengths under varying defocus [103] (see
Figure 5.1).This behavior is important because devices with shorter/longer channel
lengths have faster/slower performance. Since defocus is more systematic in nature,
performance (delay, power, etc.) will be systematically biased within chips/PUFs
and can be predicted with knowledge of chip layout, cell layout, and defocus values.
In [103], the authors exploit the behavior shown in Figure 5.1 to reduce IC
timing and leakage power sensitivity to systematic variations. We discuss the basic








Figure 5.1: Systematic and
opposing behavior of dense and













Figure 5.2: Effective channel lengths (dotted) for cells in
series. (a) dense and iso cells in series; (b) two dense cells in
series
Self-Compensation Technique. Given the opposing behavior of dense and iso
patterns during fabrication (see Figure 5.1), [103] shows that one can compensate
for systematic variation in two ways:
1. Intra-cell Self-Compensation. Within a cell, transistor polysilicon, intercon-
nects, etc. can be divided into iso/dense lines for performance compensation.
Assuming the transistors in a given cell have the same defocus value (valid as-
sumption since they are in close proximity), if an “iso” transistor and “dense”
transistor are placed in series, then at any defocus their respective delays (iso-
fast, dense-slow) will balance out, thereby resulting in an “effective” channel
length that is independent of defocus (i.e. self compensated) as shown in
Figure 5.2(a). In contrast, if both cells are dense or iso, the overall delay and
effective channel length vary more drastically with defocus (see Figure 5.2(b)).
2. Inter-cell Self-Compensation. The cells within a circuit can be divided into
iso/dense patterned cells for performance compensation as well. For example,
if an “iso” cell and “dense” cell are placed in series, then at any shared defocus
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value their respective delays (iso-fast, dense-slow) shall balance out. Thus in
this case, the delay of the circuit should be similar to an outsider regardless
of the defocus experienced during chip fabrication.
Typical circuits are designed with all iso cells (for faster speed) or all dense
cells (for lower power leakage and chip area). However, since such cells/circuits vary
heavily with defocus, ICs using either approach will suffer from high systematic vari-
ation. Self-compensation essentially makes individual cells or interconnected cells
(circuits) insensitive to defocus so that every cell or circuit has similar performance
regardless of chip location (no systematic variation across chips).
5.2.2 Impact of Variations on PUFs.
As discussed in the previous chapter, the nature of the variations experienced
during manufacturing has a large influence on PUF quality. In this section, we
qualitatively discuss the impact of systematic and random fabrication variations on
delays within PUFs below. Note that the discussion is given in the context of RO-
PUFs merely for the sake of illustration. In general, effects of variation on other
PUFs can be modeled similarly.
Assume we have an RO-PUF with m ROs. We denote the jth ring oscillator
as ROj, the delay through ROj by dj, and ROj’s oscillation frequency by fj. The
delay and oscillation frequency of ROj may be expressed as follows






where d0 is the nominal delay (intended by design), dsys,j is the systematic compo-
nent of the RO’s delay, and dran,j is the random component of the RO’s delay. dran,j
is a random variable that differs for every RO and in every PUF. dsys,j is mainly
from the lithography step and while it varies within each chip (i.e. ∀ j) it is the
same between chips/wafers (see Section 4.3.1). Note that in the above formulation,
environmental noise and across wafer variation have been ignored for simplicity.
The RO-PUF response bit generated by comparing ROg and ROh, rg,h, is
determined by the difference in delay ∆dg,h between the two ROs. Ignoring noise,
we can express ∆dg,h and rg,h by
∆dg,h = dg − dh = (dsys,g + dran,g)− (dsys,h + dran,h)
= (dsys,g − dsys,h) + (dran,g − dran,h)
= ∆dsys,g,h +∆dran,g,h (5.3)
rg,h =

1 if ∆dg,h < 0
0 otherwise
(5.4)
∆dran,g,h is random. ∆dsys,g,h is a function of the ROs’ locations on the chip through
systematic defocus and the PUF’s physical/cell layout. The effects of ∆dran,g,h and
∆dsys,g,h on RO-PUF response are as follows:
• In instances where |∆dsys,g,h| >> |∆dran,g,h|, the response rg,h is heavily biased
in the PUF population, resulting in lower uniqueness and unpredictability.
For example, if we compare an RO that experiences zero defocus with one
that experiences large defocus (assuming both ROs are composed of standard
cells), responses in the PUF population will be biased towards 1 or 0 depending
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on the density of features in the RO cells. If the cells have isolated (more
dense) features, the second RO will be faster (slower) on average resulting in a
response biased towards 1 (0). Lowering |∆dsys,g,h| should reduce such biases
and result in more unique and unpredictable responses. In Section 5.3.1, we
accomplish this by exploiting self-compensation and carefully selecting the
density of cells that make up the ROs.
• For large |∆dsys,g,h| and/or |∆dran,g,h|, the difference in delay between any
two ROs (∆dg,h) is on average greater. The larger gap in behavior of ROs
should make it more difficult for environmental variations (voltage supply,
temperature, etc.) to alter responses (i.e. change sign of ∆dg,h). This implies
greater reliability. Since the self-compensation approach reduces systematic
variation, it may actually degrade PUF reliability. One way to compensate for
losses in reliability is to increase ∆dran,g,h. We discuss approaches to do this
in Section 5.3.2.
5.3 Proposed Approach
5.3.1 Self-compensated Cell Layouts for PUFs
As discussed above, we want to make ∆dsys,g,h close to zero ∀ h, g in order
to improve PUF uniqueness and unpredictablity. The self-compensation technique
(discussed in Section 5.2.1) is one way to effectively accomplish this goal. In self-
compensation, the density of cells in a layout is chosen carefully to remove systematic
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biases in IC timing or leakage power. In our case, we choose the combination C⃗ of
cell densities in the ROs in order to reduce the impact of systematic biases in RO
frequencies and PUF responses. The formulation and objective are discussed below.
Let there be N inverter cells per RO. We assume that the delay of any inverter
cell is a function of the cell’s density p and its defocus value F at manufacturing






di is the delay of the ith inverter in the RO. pi and Fi denote the cell density and
defocus respectively of the ith inverter in the RO. Note that since the designer has
control over the physical layout, the pi’s are variables within our control. On the
other hand, the defocus values (Fi’s) are variables determined by the manufacturing
process and, hence, they are not within our control. While defocus is uncontrol-
lable, its statistical characteristics can be determined by sampling wafers in an early
manufacturing process (see Section 4.3.1). Hence, we assume that the probability
distribution function (PDF) of defocus is known and denote it by pdf(F ).
As shown in Figure 5.1, the effective channel length of the inverter will shrink
or grow depending on density pi and defocus Fi. If the inverter cell is more dense
(isolated), the effective channel lengths will grow (shrink) with defocus. By choosing
the inverter cell densities carefully, we can reduce the impact of systematic defocus
on PUF responses. In our formulation we choose the combination of cell densities
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C⃗ = [p1, p2, . . . , pN ]
T according to the following objective function:












In the above equations, σd represents the sampling variance of delay in the popula-
tion of ROs in the PUFs; µd represents the average RO delay and is computed using
the discrete defocus PDF pdf(F⃗ ); F⃗j is a vector denoting the defocus experienced by
each inverter in the RO for sample j of the defocus PDF; and k denotes the number
of bins in the PDF. The goal of the above objective function is to minimize the vari-
ance in the RO delays (frequencies) across the chip according to the defocus PDF.
This goal is similar to the one discussed in Section 5.3.1 for SVC-OPC. In order
to remove the systematic bias in any chip’s RO-PUF, all the ROs in the RO-PUF
should have the same systematic delay/frequency component (i.e. dsys,g = dsys,h
∀g, h). This effectively means any difference in delay/frequency between ROs in a
chip is purely determined by the random sources (∆dran) such as RDD, LER, etc.
because the systematic components cancel each other out (∆dsys = 0). As a result,
each PUF’s responses (signature) will be as unique and unpredictable as possible.
Note that alternative objective functions are also possible and shall be investigated
in future work.
In Section 5.4, we solve the above problem and compare the PUF responses
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resulting from our self-compensated cell layouts with standard layout approaches
(i.e. fixed cell densities for ROs in the PUFs).
5.3.2 Reliability Enhancement
As discussed in the previous chapter, increasing random variation in PUFs
has several benefits to PUF quality: better uniqueness, better unpredictability, and
higher reliability. In this section, we discuss circuit-based approaches for increasing
sensitivity to random variation in PUFs.
Targeted Source of IC variations. Threshold voltage is an independent random
variable with respect to doping [49]. Thus even for transistors that are located near
one another within a chip and across chips, there is significant random variation
in threshold voltage with little spatial correlation. In this section, we utilize this
independence property to amplify random variations by adding extra inverters and
transistors to PUF designs. Note that since inverters are used in many silicon-based
PUFs (eg. RO-PUF, SRAM PUF, arbiter PUF), the inverter-based approach is quite
general. For the sake of illustration, we describe our approach for an RO-PUF.
Inverter Cell and RO Behavior: A standard inverter cell contains a single
PMOS transistor and single NMOS transistor (see Figure 5.3(a)). Let the thresh-
old voltages for these transistors be random variables represented by vtp and vtn
respectively. The delays measured during high-to-low and low-to-high transitions
at the inverter output (dHL and dLH) can be described as functions of the threshold
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Cout is the capacitance present at the inverter’s output. IDSn and IDSp denote the
drain-to-source currents (NMOS and PMOS respectively) with mobility µ, oxide
capacitance Cox, effective channel width Weff, effective channel length Leff, supply
voltage Vdd, and modeling parameter α. Intuitively, the above expressions model
delay as the time it takes to charge and discharge Vout at the inverter’s output
capacitance.
With the above delay models, the delay for N inverters in series (i.e. ring
oscillator RO delay d) can be approximated by summing the rise and fall delays
of each inverter [105] and the oscillation frequency of the RO can be computed as
f = 1
2d
. Note that since threshold voltages vtn and vtp are random variables, d, f ,
etc. are also random and will be different for ROs within and between chips. By






















(b) current starved inverter
Figure 5.3: Standard and current starved inverters
chip. For a PUF, this should represent an increase in reliability since the ROs being
compared will be separated by larger ∆drand (as discussed in Section 5.2.2).
Extra Inverters: One way to increase variance in d is to increase the number
of inverters (N) in the RO. This works for two reasons:
1. The transistors in each inverter have independent and random threshold volt-
ages. Therefore, the contributions of each inverter to overall RO delay are also
independent and random.
2. The variance of a sum of independent variables is the sum of the variances of
the independent variables. Since the inverter delays are independent and the
RO delay is computed by summing them, ∆drand will increase as inverters are
added to the RO.
Using the above models for current, delay, etc. (Eqns. (5.9)-(5.13)), we de-
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mean variance
µd normalized σd normalized
N=3 6.64 1.00 37.0 1.00
N=7 15.5 2.33 56.8 1.54
N=13 28.8 4.33 77.1 2.09
Table 5.1: Mean (psec) and standard deviation (fsec) in RO delay as number of inverters (N)
increase in the RO
termined the mean and standard deviation of d using Monte Carlo simulations.
Table 5.1 shows the mean and standard deviation with number of inverters N=3,
7, and 13 where the means and standard deviations have been normalized by a
base case (N=3). As N increases, there is an increase in both mean and variance
of d compared to the base case. We will investigate RO-PUF quality using extra
inverters in Section 5.4
Current Starved Inverter. An alternative way to increase the random variation
in the RO delay is to add transistors to the inverter circuits in such a way that IDS,
d, f , etc. are functions of more random variables. This is essentially what occurs
in the current starved inverter [62] shown in Figure 5.3(b). The inverter transistors
are denoted by M6 and M7 and the remaining transistors M1-M5 make up current
mirrors for M6 and M7.
The key concept of the current mirror in the pull-up network of the current
starved inverter is summarized as follows. The gate and source of M1 are wired
together so that the M1 transistor is always in saturated mode (when on). Vctl is a
control voltage that (along with the random threshold voltages, widths, lengths of
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M1, M2, and M3) determines the gate voltages of M1 and M4 and the current Iref
through M1, M2, and M3. During the the low-to-high transitions at the inverter
output, the current Iout through M4 and M6 is a function of Iref (and the random
threshold voltages, widths, lengths of M4 and M6). Thus, the charging behavior at
Cout is a function of a greater number of random variables than the standard inverter
case. The current mirror for the pull-down network and discharging behavior at Cout
can be explained similarly.
Since the current starved inverter was shown to improve PUF quality in [62],
we shall only focus on our contribution (extra inverters) and will not experiment
with the current-starved inverter in the remainder of the chapter.
5.3.3 Combined Approach
We feel that there are three important benefits achieved by combining the
approaches from Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2:
1. In general, components in PUF circuits should possess high sensitivity to ran-
dom variations and low sensitivity to systematic variations. By combining the
two techniques we should effectively accomplish both of these goals.
2. In inter-cell self-compensation, each cell’s density is essentially an optimization
variable that can be used to tune and lower systematic variation due to defocus.
By adding inverter cells, we are actually adding more tuning variables and can
thereby expect more opportunities to reduce systematic variation in the PUFs.
3. Since reducing systematic variation might actually harm PUF reliability (see
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Section 5.2.2), adding additional inverters can compensate for this trend by
increasing randomness in the PUF.




In this section, we simulate RO-PUFs using several standard and proposed
schemes. In each scheme, we simulate a population of 100 PUF instances. Each
PUF contains 512 ROs and each RO contains a fixed number of inverters denoted
as N . One PUF response bit is computed by comparing the oscillation frequencies
of 2 out of the 512 ROs. Each RO is only used in one comparison so there are 256
response bits per PUF. The RO pairs are selected randomly and the same pairs are
used for each RO-PUF in the population.
# of Inverters. As discussed in Section 5.3.2, random variation should increase
with the number of inverters N in an RO. We vary N from 3 to 13 in our experiments
and examine the effects on RO-PUF quality.
Cell Density Types. To analyze self-compensation (Section 5.3.1), we utilize
five types of inverter cells:
1. Very Dense (VD) contains features which are as close as permitted by the
lithography process.
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Figure 5.4: Channel length vs. Defocus for cell layout types: (1) Very Dense VD; (2) Dense D;
(3) Isolated I; (4) Very Isolated VI; (5) Self-Compensated S
2. Dense (D) contains features which are close together, but less so than VD.
3. Very Isolated (VI) contains features which are as far as possible.
4. Isolated (I) contains features which are spaced far apart, but not as much as
the Very Isolated (VI) case.
5. Self-compensated (S) utilize intra-cell self-compensation so that features are
spaced in such a way that channel length varies little with defocus.
The channel lengths of each cell type versus defocus condition are shown in
Figure 5.4 (data from [103]). As one can see, the dense cells “smile” and the isolated
cells “frown” while the self-compensated cell is more flat w.r.t. defocus.
Cell Combination Types. We generate several PUF populations with ROs
that use different combinations of these cell types. We refer to a combination as
“standard” if there is no intra-cell or inter-cell self-compensation in the layout/cells
(eg. all three inverter cells in the ROs are VD type). We also examine two “self-
compensated” cell combinations which were obtained by solving the objective shown
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RO Inverter #
Case 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
N = 3
1 D VI S - - - - - - - - - -
2 VI S S - - - - - - - - - -
N = 7
1 VD D VI VI VI S S - - - - - -
2 D D D VI VI VI S - - - - - -
N = 13
1 VD D D D D VI VI VI VI VI VI S S
2 VD VD D D VI VI VI VI VI VI S S S
Table 5.2: Inter-cell self-compensation combinations for N = 3, 7, 13 inverter ROs.
in Eqn. (5.6). The two combinations (lowest variation) are shown in Table 5.2 for
each N . One can see that each combination contain a similar number of dense and
isolated cells with one or more self-compensated cells.
Fabrication Simulations. To simulate fabrication variation of each PUF in-
stance, we choose (1) random defocus values for each RO and (2) random threshold
voltages for every transistor (within each inverter).
Random defocus values are chosen using the quad tree model discussed in [49]
which models inter-chip and intra-chip correlations. In the quadtree modeling ap-
proach [49], the area of a chip is recursively partitioned into four equally sized re-
gions. This is illustrated in Figure 5.5. The first partition is “0-1” and corresponds
to the root of the quadtree. “0-1” is divided into four partitions “1-1”, “1-2”, “1-3”,
and “1-4” which form the next level of the tree. The four partitions are subdivided
into another four partitions and so forth. Each partition in every level of the tree is


















Figure 5.5: Quadtree partitioning for a chip. The depth of the tree shown is 3 levels.
correlated variation associated with a gate in the IC is then defined as the sum of the
RV at the lowest partition containing the gate and the RVs of the higher partitions
that overlap with the gate’s position. Correlation exists between gates on a single
chip due to the sharing of RVs at higher levels of the quadtree. Correlation between
chips exists because the probability distributions associated with each partition are
the same for all chips.
In our case, the random variables (RVs) and associated probability distribu-
tions correspond to defocus across the chip. The gates in our case are inverters in
the ring oscillators (ROs). We generate RVs for all partitions and levels in each
chip/PUF according to some knowns distributions and then compute defocus values
as follows. Suppose we want to generate the defocus value F for an RO located in
partition “2-13” of chip x (see Figure 5.5). F is computed by summing the RVs
associated with partitions “2-13”, “1-4”, and “0-1” of chip x. In our experiments,
we do this for 512 ROs and 100 chips totaling 51200 random samples. The channel
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length is determined by the cell type (VD, D, etc.) and the RO’s defocus value
using the relationships shown in Figure 5.4.
All threshold voltages are selected from a Gaussian distribution with mean .3V
and standard deviation of 20mV. With the assigned threshold voltages and channel
lengths, we compute RO delay and PUF responses for each chip using Eqns (5.9)-
(5.13) and Eqn. (5.4) respectively.
5.4.2 Results and Discussion
For the PUF populations generated above, we estimate the quality (unique-
ness, reliability, and unpredictability) of each population as follows. Uniqueness is
computed using responses from the PUF population and calculating inter-distance
(Eqn. (2.1)). For reliability, we compute PUF responses corresponding to a nom-
inal voltage supply of 1.3 volts. Then, we compute 100 sample responses where a
different supply voltage is chosen for each inverter in the RO-PUF from a normal
distribution with mean 1.3V and standard deviation 4.4mV. Unpredictabilty is mea-
sured using the NIST test suite [73]. We use the same NIST tests as the previous
chapter.
Uniqueness (Inter-distance). Mean inter-distance is shown on the left-hand
side of Table 5.3. The “standard” rows correspond to the conventional RO-PUF
design with non-compensated cell layout and fixed cell type per RO. The “self-
compensated” rows are for RO-PUFs using the intra-cell and inter-cell self-compensation
approach (cases shown in Table 5.2). The columns correspond to the number of in-
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verters N used for all ROs in the PUFs.
For standard layout, the uniqueness measure is much lower than the ideal 50%.
The best performing combination among them is “all I” (all iso cells) which in our
experiments had the lowest systematic variation in RO frequency (not shown). Self-
compensated layout improves on mean inter-distance with case 1 having the largest
mean 49.69%. This outcome is not surprising because self-compensation removes
systematic variation in chips and bias in PUF responses.
As the number of inverters (N) increases, one would expect that the increase
in random variation of the ROs would result in greater uniqueness. However, we
found different results for the two approaches. Uniqueness obtained by the stan-
dard layout approach worsened with greater N while uniqueness obtained by self-
compensated approaches slightly increased. We explain this phenomena as follows.
In the standard approach, more “alike” inverters are added into the RO. While this
does increase the overall random variation, systematic variation will also increase
because the inverters are similarly biased with defocus. This lowers uniqueness.
In the self-compensated approach, uniqueness is improved in two ways. First, we
increase random variation by adding additional inverters. Second, we have more
inverters to compensate with (more tuning variables) and therefore can obtain even
lower systematic variation.
Reliability (Intra-distance). The right-hand side of Table 5.3 shows mean
intra-distance with random voltage supply variation over the PUF population. The
columns and rows are organized as discussed for uniqueness. The ideal reliability
occurs when intra-distance is 0% meaning no deviation in PUF responses from the
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Uniqueness Reliability
Case N=3 N=7 N=13 N=3 N=7 N=13
all VD 43.91 43.86 43.14 4.05 3.31 3.38
standard all D 42.25 41.31 39.82 3.98 3.22 3.18
layout all VI 42.71 41.42 39.68 3.83 2.82 2.58
all I 48.07 47.73 47.03 4.64 3.97 3.43
self- 1 49.34 49.55 49.69 5.28 5.01 4.56
compensated 2 49.11 49.36 49.59 5.27 4.99 4.51
Table 5.3: PUF uniqueness and reliability (mean inter- and intra-distance)
response at nominal voltage supply.
For N = 3, the standard layout approaches yield better average reliability
compared to the self-compensated approaches. We assume this occurs because sys-
tematic variation is high for the standard layouts thereby creating a larger gap
between RO frequencies/delays that are compared. Intuitively, this means there
is a smaller chance of the PUF response bits flipping as a result of environmental
variations. The self-compensated layouts have lower systematic variation and are
therefore more prone to changes in response.
As N increases, the increase in random variation of the ROs results in better
reliability for both standard and self-compensated layouts. On average, from N
= 3 to 13, there is an average improvement of 25% for the standard layouts and
14% for the self-compensated layouts. The reason that reliability improvements are
greater for the standard layouts is as follows. As inverters are added to ROs in the
standard layouts, there is an increase in systematic variation (as discussed above for
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uniqueness) and with more variation comes greater reliability.
Unpredictability (NIST tests). We found that all test cases passed nearly all
the NIST tests for randomness in PUFs. We found that standard layout approaches
failed 1 to 3 out of 18 tests while the self-compensated layout approaches only failed
1 out of 18 tests at most. Neither approach seemed to be noticeably affected by
extra inverters.
Summary of Results. The results of this section are summarized as follows:
• The proposed self-compensated layout reduces systematic variation and im-
proves PUF uniqueness. Compared to the worst (best) standard layout, self-
compensated layouts resulted in 14% (2.6%) better uniqueness.
• Extra inverters have an interesting impact on uniqueness. Adding more “alike”
inverters increases systematic variation in the standard layout PUFs (lowering
uniqueness). However, the uniqueness improves with additional inverters in
the self-compensated PUFs.
• Extra inverters increase random variation in both the standard and self-compensated
layout PUFs and improve their reliability by 25% and 14% respectively.
• The NIST tests show that the proposed self-compensated approaches are
marginally less predictable than the standard approaches. Unpredictability
neither improves nor degrades with extra inverters.
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5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we manipulated manufacturing variations in PUFs to simul-
taneously reduce the impact of systematic variations while enhancing the random
variations. The merits of the overall approach in this chapter are as follows:
• PUF Quality Improvements at Physical Layout Step. Our self-compensation-
based approach is one of the first to improve PUFs at the physical layout level.
Specifically, we proposed an optimization framework that creates custom cell
layouts for reducing the impact of systematic variations on PUF signatures.
Furthermore, since our approach works on the physical layout, it can easily be
combined with existing PUF enhancement approaches, such as better circuit
designs and post-fabrication processing.
• Interaction of Layout and Design Approaches. We showed that by combining
our custom cells with naive random variation enhancement solution (extra
inverters), it was possible to obtain improvements to PUF uniqueness and
reliability. Our work highlights the need to investigate the interaction of PUF
circuit layout and design.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion and Future Research Directions
In Chapter 1, we highlighted many of the key issues and challenges in hardware
security. The IC design/fabrication flow itself is highly susceptible to malicious
attacks that threaten to subvert the security and reliability of all systems dependent
on ICs. Recent advances in tampering, reverse engineering, etc. also compound the
trust issues in computing systems after they are deployed. The main theme of
our work has been to address the diversity of such hardware-based attacks through
comprehensive strategies that secure hardware platforms during design, fabrication,
and post-deployment. Our overall strategy (discussed in Section 1.4) consisted of
three phases: Bootstrap, Validate, Monitor and React. In Chapter 2, we discussed
two key areas of research in hardware security which could benefit from steps in this
strategy: hardware Trojan detection and Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs).
In Chapter 3, we proposed novel run-time Trojan detection approaches which
were basic instances of our comprehensive strategy. Our approaches exploited on-
chip thermal sensors which already exist in many modern systems for dynamic ther-
mal management. We statistically characterized IC’s power/thermal dynamics to
create “golden models” and placed optimally thermal sensors based on these statis-
tics. After fabrication, we gathered information from ICs that pass logic-based and
side channel-based detection approaches in order to calibrate each IC for fabrication
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variation. The run-time phase integrated the information from the previous phases
with thermal sensor measurements to detect Trojan activation. Simulation results
using state-of-the-art tools on publicly available Trojan benchmarks verified that
our approaches could detect Trojans quickly and with few false positives.
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) rely on IC fabrication variations to
generate unique signatures for various hardware security applications. In this disser-
tation, we highlighted the fact that there has been limited focus on PUF fabrication
(source of PUF quality) in prior work and explored ‘Bootstrapping’ opportunities
at mask generation and physical layout levels to overcome this flaw. In Chapter 4,
we showed that our SVC-OPC and P-OPC masks outperformed the conventional
approach (C-OPC) in at least one of the PUF quality metrics (uniqueness, reliabil-
ity, unpredictability) without significant loss in others. Being mask-based, neither
approach had significant overheads with respect to IC area, power, etc. In Chapter
5, we also discussed a designer-friendly approach for improving PUFs that utilized
self-compensated custom cell layouts. This approach resulted in better PUF unique-
ness compared to conventional cell layouts and obtained even better results when
combined with random variation-enhancing PUF designs.
6.1 Future Research
The approaches presented in this dissertation are very innovative and uncon-
ventional compared to existing work. Being among the first to investigate these
approaches, there are still opportunities for further improvements as well as some
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open issues that exist in defense against hardware Trojan and for improving PUFs.
6.1.1 Defense Against Trojans
The fundamental limits of Trojan detection as well as the overheads of test-
time and run-time approaches are still being actively investigated. In this disser-
tation, we discussed novel run-time approaches that exploited temperature and a
comprehensive Trojan detection framework. This research shall act as an important
building block for many other directions we plan to pursue in future work:
1. Further Application of Theoretical Foundations. The temperature-based tech-
nique we proposed relies heavily upon the fundamental foundations provided
by state estimation theory and detection theory. There are many open prob-
lems in hardware Trojan research that should be able to exploit the same gen-
eral theory. For instance, existing test-time approaches tend to be ad-hoc and
less rigorous in nature. Our Kalman Filter-based approach should naturally
extend to various test-time detection schemes that rely on side channels. Fur-
thermore, the KF framework is robust enough to handle multiple side channel
modalities for even better results. For example, by combining thermal sensor
measurements with current monitors, one can reduce the uncertainty in the
power statistics in time, thereby enabling even better thermal state estimation
and Trojan detection.
2. Reaction Mechanisms to Trojan Attacks. Our work has only focused on the
first step of ’Monitor and React.’ We showed that it was possible to monitor
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temperature to detect Trojans at run-time. However, once a Trojan attack has
been detected, one needs to prevent it from doing damage with appropriate
defense mechanisms. For instance, one interesting way to respond to attacks is
with self-correcting designs that automatically bypass Trojan logic. With the
overheads involved with adding such mechanisms and the fact that Trojans
may attack the mechanisms themselves, this is a very challenging area of
research.
3. On-chip Tampering of Measurements. The effectiveness of run-time approaches
for Trojan detection depends heavily on the accuracy of on-chip measurements.
One way an attacker might circumvent detection is to insert a Trojan in the
sensing infrastructure. For example, the Trojan could bypass the real mea-
surements with fake measurements that comply with the expected side-channel
behavior. Formal methods that not only detect tampering of sensor measure-
ments, but overcome it are critical for future run-time approaches.
4. Temperature-based Trojan Detection Prototypes. We have emphasized that
our temperature-based detection approach is effective and low-overhead. How-
ever, to our knowledge, the Kalman Filtering framework for temperature track-
ing has not been physically realized in a prototype as of yet. We feel that a
prototype/testbed implementation is an important final step in evaluating our
approach. First, since the complicated interaction of hardware, software, and
environmental conditions is hard to emulate in simulations, experiments per-
formed with a real-time testbed could provide more accurate results and high-
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light impracticalities unforeseen by the applied theory. Second, the implemen-
tation would yield a better estimate of the software and hardware overheads
involved in our approach.
6.1.2 Opportunities and Challenges in PUF Manufacturing
Our work has been the first to shift the focus of DFM towards improving
PUF quality during fabrication. In future, we shall continue to investigate how
randomness in PUFs can be improved while still maintaining the spirit of DFM (i.e.
manufacturability/yield):
1. Ways to Manipulate Dose Variation. While there are two types of variation in
IC fabrication (defocus and dose), we have only looked closely at the opportu-
nities for improving sensitivity to defocus variation. However, techniques that
manipulate dose variation might provide further enhancements to PUF quality
either on their own or combined with our previous techniques. For example,
the ASM DoseMapper technology [106] controls exposure dose during IC fab-
rication and has been successfully used in prior work [107] for better timing
and leakage power in the face of process variations. Naturally, it should be
possible to combine our objective functions/framework with the DoseMapper
technology to improve PUF sensitivity to either systematic or random dose
variations.
2. Transistors With Greater Sensitivity to Random Variations. Our custom cell
layouts reduced the impact of systematic variation on PUFs. Such layout-
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based approaches are not only applicable to all different types of PUFs, but
they can also be effectively combined with random variation enhancing circuit
designs. As an alternative approach, we could go one step further and develop
transistor gate, drain, source terminals explicitly for PUFs. New fabrication
materials, doping techniques, topologies, etc. that make the underlying tran-
sistors more sensitive to independent random variations would be particularly
useful since they would effectively compliment our layout and mask-based ap-
proaches that reduce systematic variations.
3. Investigate Manufacturing/Yield Issues. While the mask-based approaches
should not affect the manufacturability of non-PUF portions of ICs, there’s
still a chance that some of the PUF components will be non-functional. In
future work, we would like to investigate the manufacturing/yield issues caused
by our approach either by using our masks to fabricate real silicon chips or
using more advanced software simulations. If there does happen to be yield
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